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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
SISCO HILTE and ZURICH AMERICAN
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Plaintiffs/Appellants,
Case No. 870592-CA
vs.
LESTER WAYNE SMITH and THE
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH,

(Case Priority No. 6)

Defendants/Respondents.
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS SISCO HILTE and
ZURICH AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY

STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Did Smith's lifting of fifty pounds, one and a half feet
from knee level to his waist, contribute something substantial
to the risk he already faced in everyday life because of his
preexisting back condition?
Jurisdictional Statement
Jurisdiction vests pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-83
(Supp. 1986).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE AND CASE
The determinative statute is Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-45
(Supp.1986), a copy of which is attached hereto as Addendum
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"A."

The determinative case is Allen v. Industrial Commission,

729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986), a copy of which is attached as
Addendum "B,"
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case:
Smith claims benefits under the Utah Workers' Compensation

Act.
B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition by the Industrial
Commission:
1.

On August 26, 1986, Smith filed an Application with

the Industrial Commission, seeking compensation and medical
benefits from his employer, Sisco Hilte and its insurance
carrier, Zurich American Insurance Company, ("Appellants").
(R. at 4-5.)
2.

Appellants deny that Smith suffered a compensable

accident.
3.

(R. at 7. )

On July 30, 1986, Judge Moffitt issued her Findings of

Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order.

She determined that

although Smith had a pre-existing back condition, his 1986
lifting episode constituted a compensable industrial accident.
(R. at 290-296.)
4.

See Addendum "C."

On August 17, 1987, appellants filed a Motion For

Review contending that Smith's lifting incident did not
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constitute a compensable industrial accident.

(R. at 197,

258-60 and 265-66.)
5.

The Industrial Commission denied appellants' Motion

for Review on December 7, 1987, concluding that it "does not
believe a typical nonemployment activity of men and women in
the latter part of the twentieth century includes lifting 50
pounds."
6.

(R. at 306.)

See Addendum "D4"

On December 31, 1987, Appellants sought review by this

Court of the Industrial Commission's Denial of Appellant's
Motion.
C.

(R. at 308.)

Statement of the Facts:
1.

While at work on March 25, 1986, Smith lifted a steel

plate from a knee high stack, approximately one and one-half
feet to his waist.
pounds.

(R. at 41.)

(R. at 291.)

The steel plate weighed fifty

It was 8 to 12 feet long by 14 inches

wide by 1/4 to 3/8 of an inch thick.

After lifting the plate

to his waist, Smith "set it back down."

(R. at 15, 17, 41 and

291.)
2.

While lifting the steel plate, Smith felt a snap in

his back and experienced pain down his right leg.
3.

Smith's back did not hurt much, but he experienced

pain and a burning sensation in his right leg.
4.

(R. at 15.)

(R. at 15, 19.)

Smith did not testify that the steel plate was diffi-

cult or awkward to lift.

(R. at 9-45.)
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5.

The following day Smith consulted a chiropractor,

Kenneth G. Hansen, about his back injury.
291.)

(R. at 243, 245,

Smith received massage, heat and chiropractic adjust-

ments from Hansen every other day for seven weeks.

(R. at

19-21.)
6.

On May 9, 1986, Smith was examined by Dr. Alan T.

Hunstock, who later admitted Smith to the Utah Valley Regional
Medical Center for corrective back surgery.
7.

Since the surgery, Smith joined a bowling league for

the first time.
8.

(R. at 22 and 208.)

(R. at 41.)

At the hearing, Smith denied that he had back problems

prior to the lifting incident of March 25, 1986, (R. at 295).
However, the medical records clearly demonstrates that Smith
suffered a serious low back injury in 1980 when he bent over an
automobile fender at work.

At that time he felt something snap

in his back with pain radiating down both legs.

(R. at 94,

107-31, 220-23, 283, 292.)
9.

As a result of that injury, Smith consulted Dr. John P.

Mendenhall, who admitted Smith to the hospital on April 10,
1980 for severe low back pain.

(R. at 94, 252.)

Following the

hospitalization Smith continued to see Dr. Mendenhall.
35, 94-100, 121-32, 218-223.)

(R. at

Smith also received extensive

physical therapy and a transcutaneous nerve stimulator.
121-31, 125, 130, 221, 233.)

-4-

(R. at

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Industrial Commission's legal determination of what
standard should be used to establish legal causation is fully
reviewable by this Court.
Because Smith suffered a back injury in 1980, he must prove
that lifting fifty pounds from his knee to waist contributed
something substantial to the risks he already faced in everyday
life; otherwise he cannot establish that he suffered a compensable industrial accident.

Although the Commission concluded

that Smith's lifting of fifty pounds constituted unusual and
extraordinary exertion sufficient to satisfy the legal causation requirement, current case law and authorities present a
contrasting view.

Indeed, the lifting incident in the instant

case is similar to and less exertive than nonemployment activities recognized by the Utah Supreme Court in Allen v. Industrial
Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986).

Accordingly, Smith's

lifting incident did not contribute anything substantial to the
risks he already faced in everyday life and did not involve
unusual or extraordinary exertion.

Thus, Smith's lifting

incident cannot satisfy the legal causation requirement for a
compensable industrial accident.

-5-

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DETERMINATION OF WHAT CONSTITUTES LEGAL
CAUSATION IS FULLY REVIEWABLE BY THIS COURT.
In Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15, 20 (Utah
1986), the Utah Supreme Court adopted a two-part causation test
to determine whether an incident constitutes a compensable
industrial accident under Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-45 (Supp. 1986).
The Court noted that "compensable injuries can best be identified by first considering the legal cause of injury."
added.)

Allen, 729 P.2d at 25.

(Emphasis

See also Larson, Workmen's

Compensation § 38-83(a) at 7-273 (1986).

The Court further

observed that "[u]nder the legal test, the law must define what
kind of exertion satisfies the test of
employment.'"

Allen, 729 P.2d at 25.

legal causation is a question of law.

arising out of the
Thus the question of
As such, it can "be

reviewed by this Court with no deference to the Commission."
Giles v. Industrial Commission, 692 P.2d 743, 745 (Utah 1984).
See also Board of Education v. Olsen, 684 P.2d 49 (Utah 1984).
POINT II
SMITH'S LIFTING INCIDENT DOES NOT SATISFY
THE LEGAL CAUSATION STANDARD NECESSARY FOR A
COMPENSABLE INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT.
A.

Where An Employee Suffers From A Pre-Existing Condition
Aggravated By Employment Activities, He Must Show That
The Employment Activity Contributed Something Substantial To Increase The Risk He Already Faced In Everyday
Life Because Of His Condition.
-6-

Where an injured employee suffers from a preexisting
condition aggravated by employment, the employee must prove
legal causation.
[T]o meet the legal causation requirement, a claimant
with a preexisting condition must show that the employment contributed something substantial to increase the
risk he already faced in everyday life because of his
condition. This additional element of risk in the
workplace is usually supplied by an exertion greater
than that undertaken in normal, everyday life. This
extra exertion serves to offset the preexisting condition of the employee as a likely cause of the injury,
thereby eliminating claims for impairments resulting
from a personal risk rather than exertions at work.
(Emphas is added.)
Allen, 729 P.2d at 25; and Larson, Supra., at § 38.83(b), at
7-278.

This higher standard of proof required of employees

with preexisting conditions screens out claims for injuries
that result from personal risk or the normal wear and tear of
everyday life.
B.

Smith Suffered From A Pre-Existing Condition
Aggravated By His Lifting Incident.

Although Smith denied having a preexisting low back
condition (R. at 25), the medical records and Medical Panel
Report establish that he did have such a pre-existing condition
which required substantial medical treatment.
282-283.)

(R. at 220-23,

See also Addendum "E." Without hesitation, the

Administrative Law Judge and the Industrial Commission acknowledged that Smith suffered from "a previous back condition"
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aggravated by the March 1986 lifting incident.

(R. at 305.)

Accordingly, to establish legal causation in this case, Smith
must demonstrate that the task of lifting a 50 pound steel
plate from knee level to his waist "contributed something
substantial to increase the risk he already faced in everyday
life because of his [preexisting] condition."
C.

Id. at 25.

Smith's Lifting Incident Did Not Constitute
Extraordinary Exertion.

In Allen, the Utah Supreme Court determined that Allen was
lifting several loads of dairy products, weighing from 33 to 50
pounds not including the weight of the containers and crates in
which the products were contained, at the time he injured his
back.

Under these circumstances, the Utah Supreme Court

determined that:
[s]ince the claimant had previous back problems, to
meet the legal causation requirement he must show that
moving and lifting several piles of dairy products
weighing 30 to 50 pounds [exclusive of the weight of
crates] in the confined area of the cooler exceeded
the exertion that the average person typically
undertakes in non-employment life. (Emphasis added.)
Allen, 729 P.2d at 28. After reviewing the facts the Court
could not find that Allen's activities satisfied the legal
causation test.

Thus, the Court remanded to allow the claimant

an opportunity to establish additional evidence on the legal
causation issue.
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In this case Smith only lifted fifty pounds one and a half
feet from his knees to his waist in an unobstructed area.
is less exertive than the activities in Allen.

This

Since the more

exertive Allen activities did not establish legal causation,
the less exertive activities of Smith do not either.
Other courts have determined that lifting heavier objects
than the steel plates in the instant case is normal for nonemployment life.
In Newbanks v. Foursome Package and Bar, Inc., 201 Neb.
818, 272 N.W.2d 372 (1978), a bartender/manager suffered neck,
chest and arm pains while lifting a 60 pound case of whiskey.
He was diagnosed as having arterial sclerosis and angina.

This

condition pre-existed and was aggravated by the lifting incident.

The Compensation Board held that "the degree of exertion

demonstrated by the evidence was not greater than that found in
nonemployment life. . . . "

Id. at 374.

The Nebraska Supreme

Court affirmed the Board's decision.
In Hyatt v. Kay Windsor, Inc., 198 Neb. 580, 254 N.W.2d 92
(1977), a traveling sales representative suffered a heart
attack while loading four 80 pound sample bags into his car.
He had pre-existing heart problems.

The Workmen's Compensation

Court denied the claim because the injury resulted from natural
causes, not from carrying the 80 pound sample bags.

The

Supreme Court affirmed the denial, holding that the claimant
failed to establish necessary causation.
-9-

The Administrative Law Judge's reliance on Giles v.
Industrial Commission, 692 P.2d 743 (Utah 1984) to support a
finding of legal causation in this case was inappropriate.
Giles suffered from a preexisting eye condition.

He attempted

to lift the door of a milk delivery truck which had become
jammed.

While "jerking on the jammed door," Giles retina

became detached.

Later it took a power jack to lift the door

far enough to enable a boy to crawl under it and remove the
obstruction.

Smith's lifting of fifty pounds one and a half

feet from his knee to his waist is in no way comparable to
Giles' tremendous exertion in "jerking" on an immovable object.
D.

Smith's Activity Is Similar To And Less Exertive Than
Typical Non-Employment Activities Recognized By The
Utah Supreme Court.

The Utah Supreme Court declared that typical non-employment
activities and exertions of men and women today "include taking
full garbage cans to the street, lifting and carrying luggage
for travel, and changing a flat tire on an automobile [and]
lifting a small child to chest height. . . . "
at 26.

Allen 729 P.2d

(Emphasis added.)

In attempting to apply the Allen "typical non-employment
activities" standards in the instant case, Judge Moffitt and
the Industrial Commission concluded that "[t]he lifting of an
awkward steel plate which weighs approximately 50 pounds from a
level which is approximately between the applicant's waist and
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knees seems to . . . [be] a somewhat unusual exertion . . . ,
(R. at 293) "that goes beyond what typically is required in
non-employment life in general."

(R. at 306,)

Neither Judge Moffitt nor the Industrial Commission state
any reason why Smith's lifting incident differs from or
requires more exertion than "the typical activities and nonemployment exertions" enumerated in Allen, except for (1) the
Commission's conclusory and unsubstantiated statement that
"[t]he Commission does not believe men and women typically lift
50 pounds," even though the Commission acknowledges that some
items listed by the Supreme Court (garbage cans and tires) "may
weigh 50 pounds;" and (2) the Commission's mischaracterization
and incorrect conclusion that Smith's lifting incident was
awkward.

(R. at 306.)

In contrast to the Commission's conclusory determination, a
detailed comparison of Smith's lifting activities with the
typical non-employment activities recognized by the Utah
Supreme Court demonstrates that Smith's lifting incident is
similar and sometimes less exertive than the non-employment
activities listed in Allen.
For example, "taking a full garbage can to the street" may
typically involve lifting more than 50 pounds.

Depending on

the dimensions of the garbage can, the task will require
hunching and awkward positioning while walking.
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In contrast,

grasping a thin 14 inch wide steel plate and lifting it one and
a half feet from knee level to the waist is less awkward and
less exertive.

Furthermore, lifting such a steel plate would

not require hunching and awkward positioning.

Unlike a garbage

can, the steel plate could be balanced.
"Lifting and carrying" baggage for travel is often more
exertive and awkward than Smith's lifting.
may also involve lifting greater weight.
typical baggage is a one hand task.

Carrying baggage

Furthermore, carrying

Thus, one may carry a

heavy bag in either hand along with an additional bag over the
shoulder.

The steel plate could be carried in two hands.

"Changing a flat tire on an automobile" may typically be
more awkward and exertive than Smith's lifting incident.

[The

Commission neglected the fact that the Supreme Court spoke of
changing a flat tire, not just lifting a tire.]

Changing a

tire involves reaching into awkward compartments to remove
equipment, using a jack to elevate heavy automobiles, removing
and tightening lug nuts, awkwardly lifting spare tires from
storage compartments, and then placing them on the axle.
the entire process must be reversed.

Then

Smith's lifting a metal

plate one and a half feet from his knees to his waist seems
insignificant when compared to changing a flat tire on an
automobile.
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Lifting a small child to chest height may also be more
exertive and awkward.

Small children are different shapes and

sizes, with no particular center of gravity, making them
somewhat awkward to lift.

Children's movements are unpredict-

able making it difficult to lift and balance them at chest
height.

In addition, lifting a child to chest height could

require more exertion than lifting a thin, flat, non-mobile
object from knee to waist height only.
Finally, the exertion involved in Smith's lifting incident
is similar and in some cases requires less exertion than other
typical non-employment activities such as lifting and carrying
50 pound bags of salt to fill water softeners, lifting and
carrying gardening and landscaping materials such as bags of
fertilizer, wheelbarrows or machinery, exercising with weights
or rowing machines, carrying cement bags and fencing materials,
and bowling.
Under these circumstances, the Industrial Commission
committed reversible error by concluding that Smith's lifting
incident contributed something substantial to the risks he
already faced in everyday life.

Indeed, under the Allen list

of nonemployment activities, there was nothing unusual or
extraordinary in the exertion and manner in which Smith lifted
the steel plate from knee level to his '*aist.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, plaintiffs/appellants Sisco Hilte
and Zurich American Insurance Company respectfully request this
Court to reverse the Commission's decision and award in all
respects.
DATED this 4th day of May, 1988.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

Lar^y R. Laycock
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/
Appellants
SCMLRL126
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ADDENDUM "A"
Utah Code Ann, § 35-1-45 (Supp. 1986):
COMPENSATION FOR INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENTS TO BE PAID,
Every employee mentioned in Section 35-1-43 who is
injured, and the dependents of every such employee who
is killed, by accident arising out of or in the course
of his employment, wherever such injury occurred, if
the accident was not purposely self-inflicted, shall
be paid compensation for loss sustained on account of
the injury or death, and such amount for medical, nurse,
and hospital services and medicines, and, in case of
death, such amount of funeral expenses, as provided in
this chapter. The responsibility for compensation and
payment of medical, nursing, and hospital services and
medicines, and funeral services provided under this
chapter shall be on the employer and its insurance
carrier and not on the employee.

EXHIBIT A-l

ADDENDUM "B"

ALLEN v. INDUSTRIAL COMN

Utah

15

Cite as 729 ?2d I5 (Utah 1986)

Robert A. ALLEN, Plaintiff,
v.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, Board of
Review, Jer Ken, Inc., State Insurance
Fund and Second Injury Fund, Defendants.
No. 20026.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Nov. 14, 1986.
Worker, who sustained lower back injuries while stacking milk crates containing
four to six gallons of milk, sought review
of an order of the Industrial Commission,
denying his motion for review of an order
of an administrative law judge denying his
workers' compensation claim. The Supreme Court, Durham, J., held that (1)
finding that worker's injury was not "by
accident" was not based on the evidence
and, thus, was erroneous, but (2) worker's
claim would be remanded for further fact
finding as to whether action of worker,
who had previous back problems, in lifting
several piles of milk crates exceeded exertion which average person typically undertook in nonemployment life and whether
medically demonstrable causal link existed
between worker's lifting and injury to his
back.
Vacated and remanded.
Hall, CJ., filed opinion concurring in
part and dissenting in part, with Stewart,
Associate C.J., joining in the dissent
Stewart, Associate CJ., dissented and
filed opinion.
1. Evidence <s»18
Supreme Court took judicial notice that
liquid milk weighs about the same as liquid
water or approximately eight and one-third
pounds per gallon; thus, four gallons of
milk weigh about 33 pounds without the
containers and crate, and six gallons of
milk weigh about 50 pounds without containers and crate.

EXHIBIT

B-l

2. Workers' Compensation s»515
For purposes of workers' compensation, key requirement of an "accident" is
that occurrence be unanticipated, unplanned, and unintended; where either
cause of injury or result of exertion is
different from what would normally be expected to occur, occurrence is unplanned,
unforeseen, and unintended and, thus, by
"accident"; clarifying Catling v. Industrial Commission, 16 Utah 2d 260, 399 P.2d
202. U.C.A.1953, 3&-1-45.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
3. Workers' Compensation @»515
For purposes of workers' compensation, proof of unusual event may be helpful
m determining C2usa) connection between
injury and employment; however, proof of
unusual event is not required as an element
of requirement that injury be "by accident" U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45.
4. Workers' Compensation e»515
An "accident" for purposes of requirement that injury be "by accident" to be
compensable under Workers' Compensation
Act, is an unexpected or unintended occurrence that may be either the cause or the
result of an injury; abandoning Redman
Warehousing
Corp.
v.
Industrial
Comm'n, 22 Utah 2d 398, 454 P.2d 283;
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints v. Industrial Commission, 590
P.2d 328 (Utah); Farmer's Grain Cooperative v. Mason, 606 P.2d 237 (Utah);
Sabo's Elec. Serv. v. Sabo, 642 P.2d 722
(Utah); Billings Computer Corp. v. Tar<ingo, 674 P.2d 104 (Utah). U.CA.1953,
3&-1-45.
5. Workers' Compensation <3=»568
Key question in workers' compensation
case in determining causation is whether,
given worker's body and worker's exertion,
the exertion in fact contributed to the injury. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45.
6. Workers' Compensation <*=»552, 568
Only those injuries which occur because some condition or exertion required
by employment increases risk of injury

16 Utah
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which worker normally faces in his everyday life is compensable under Workers'
Compensation Act; injuries which coincidentally occur at work because preexisting
condition results in symptoms which appear
during work hours without any enhancement from the work place are not compensable. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45.
7. Workers' Compensation <s=>597
For purposes of workers' compensation, two-part causation test, requiring consideration of legal cause and medical cause
of injury, is required in determining whether causal connection exists between injury
and worker's employment; abandoning
Billings Computer Corp. v. Tarango, 674
P.2d 104 (Utah); Sabo's Elec. Serv. v.
Sabo, 642 P.2d 722 (Utah); Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Industrial Commission, 590 P.2d 328 (Utah);
IGA Food Fair v. Martin, 584 P.2d 828
(Utah); Nuzum v. Roosendahl Construction and Mining Corp., 565 P.2d 1144
(Utah); Jones v. California Packing
Corp., 121 Utah 612, 244 P.2d 640; Robertson v. Industrial Commission, 109 Utah
25, 163 P.2d 331; Thomas D. Dee Memorial Hospital Ass'n v. Industrial Commission, 104 Utah 61, 138 P.2d 233; Kaiser
Steel Corp. v. Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888
(Utah); Schmidt v. Industrial Commission, 617 P.2d 693 (Utah); Residential and
Commercial Construction Co. v. Industrial Commission, 529 P.2d 427 (Utah);
Powers v. Industrial Commission, 19
Utah 2d 140, 427 P.2d 740; Baker v. Industrial Commission, 17 Utah 2d 141, 405
P.2d 613; Purity Biscuit Co. v. Industrial
Commission, 115 Utah 1, 201 P.2d 961.
U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45.
8. Workers1 Compensation &=*553
Where claimant suffers from preexisting condition which contributes to injury,
unusual or extraordinary exertion is required to prove "legal causation," for purposes of two-part causation test for determining whether causal connection exists
between claimant's injury and claimant's
employment; where there is no preexisting
condition, a usual or an ordinary exertion is

sufficient to prove legal causation. U.C.A.
2953, 35-1-45.
9, Workers' Compensation <s»597
For purposes of legal causation element of two-part test for determining
whether causal connection exists between
claimant's injury and claimant's employment, precipitating exertion must be compared with usual wear and tear and exertions of nonemployment life of people in
general, not nonemployment life of the particular claimant in question. U.C.A.1953,
3&-1-45.
10. Workers' Compensation <s»597
Under medical causation portion of
two-part test for determining whether
causal connection exists between claimant's
injury and claimant's employment, claimant
must show by evidence, opinion, or otherwise that stress, strain, or exertion required by his or her occupation led to resulting injury or disability. U.C.A.1953,
35-1-45.
H. Workers' Compensation <s=>1390
Evidence of ordinariness or usualness
of employee's exertions may be relevant to
medical conclusion of causal connection between claimant's injury and claimant's employment. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45.
12. Workers' Compensation e=>1533
Finding that claimant's lower back injury was not "by accident" as claimant was
stacking milk crates was not based on the
evidence and, thus, was erroneous; claimant experienced unexpected and unanticipated injury to his back as he lifted crate
of milk in cramped area of cooler, claimant
had not complained of pain or limitations at
his job, and no evidence indicated that injury was predictable or developed gradually
as with occupational disease or progressive
back disorder. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45.
13. Workers' Compensation <s=>1950
Compensation claim of worker, who
had preexisting back problems and sustained lower back injuries while stacking
crates containing four to six gallons of
milk, was remanded for further fact finding on issue as to whether moving and
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lifting several piles of crates weighing 30
to 50 pounds in confined area of cooler
exceeded exertion average person typically
undertook in nonemployment life and
whether there was medically demonstrable
causal link between worker's action in lifting milk crates and injury to his back and,
thus, ultimately, whether his injury "arose
out of or in the course of employment"
U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45.
Michael E. Bulson, Ogden, for plaintiff.
Gilbert Martinez, Salt Lake City, for Second Injury.
Fred R. Silvester, James R. Black, Salt
Lake City, for State Ins. Fund.
DURHAM, Justice:
Claimant Robert A. Allen seeks a review
from the Industrial Commission's denial of
his motion for review of an administrative
law judge order denying him compensation
for a back injury sustained at work. For
the reasons stated below, we reverse and
remand.
[1] On November 23, 1982, the claimant, aged 36, was employed as night manager of Kent's Foods. The claimant testified to the following version of events at a
hearing before an administrative law
judge. The claimant was working in a
confined cooler in the store stacking crates,
containing four to six gallons1 of milk,
from the floor onto a cooler shelf. While
lifting one crate to about chest level, he
suddenly felt a sharp pain in his lower
back. He immediately set down the crate
and asked another employee to continue
stocking the shelves. The claimant completed the one-half hour remaining in his
shift doing desk work. That night the pain
increased, and by morning his left leg felt
numb. Four or five days later, he saw Dr.
Ivan Wright about his back problem. Initial doctor visits during December were
followed through with the prescribed treat1. We take judicial notice that liquid milk weighs
about the same as liquid water or approximately
8'/3 pounds per gallon. Thus, four gallons of
milk weigh about 33 pounds without the con-

ment of bed rest and medication. A myelogram finally revealed a herniated disc, and
the claimant spent ten days in tractidn in
the hospital in early January. He did not
return to work.
The claimant also testified he had a history of prior back injuries, including a fall
from a telephone pole at age fourteen
which required him to wear a back brace
for several months, a back injury in 1977
while lifting sand bags for the Logan
School District, and another fall while
working for that employer when he slipped
on a slick concrete ramp and broke his
coccyx. None of the prior injuries resulted
in prolonged absences from work.
The testimony from other sources varied
slightly from the report given by the claimant. The employer's report of injury describes the accident as "picking up freight
and stocking it on shelves, lifting boxes
and stacking them from truck.'' No specific event was mentioned in the employer's
report. The medical records of treating
physicians described the claimant's previous injuries, but omitted any reference to a
specific incident in the cooler. Dr. Hannan,
who examined the claimant on December
31, 1982, wrote, "He does not remember
any distinct episode as having precipitated
his current problem, however." And in a
letter from Dr. Bryner to Dr. Wright dated
January 13, 1983, the claimant's history
was related as follows: "About six weeks
ago, however, he was lifting material at
work, and recalls no specific injury or
stress but developed discomfort in his left
groin area which ultimately extended into
his big toe."
The administrative law judge found that
the claimant's injury to his back on November 23. 1982, was not "an injury by accident arising out of or in the course of
employment" It is apparent that the administrative law judge, using a specific episode analysis, concluded there was no "accident" because there was no identifiable
miners and crate. Six gallons of milk weigh
approximately 50 pounds without the containers
and crate.
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event that caused the injury and because
lifting the crates of milk was * routine 2&d
commonplace exertion expected of the job.
The administrative law judge analogized
the facts of this case to Farmer's Grain
Cooperative v. Mason, 606 P.2d 237 (Utah
1980), where a gradually developed back
injury was held to be not compensable
where the condition worsened without the
intervention of any external occurrence or
trauma.
The sole issue on appeal is whether the
claimant, who had suffered preexisting
back problems and was injured as the result of an exertion usual and typical for his
job, was injured "by accident arising out of
or in the course of employment" as required by the Workers' Compensation Act,
U.C.A., 1953, § 35-1-45 (Supp.1986). That
Act, in pertinent part, provides:
Every employee ... who is injured . •.
by accident arising out of or iiv tte
course of his employment ... shall be
paid compensation for loss sustained on
account of the injury
Id This statute creates two prerequisites
for a finding of a compensable injury.
First, the injury must be "by accident."
Second, the language "arising out of or in
the course of employment" requires that
there be a causal connection between the
injury and the employment. See Pittsburgh Testing Laboratory v. Keller, 657
P.2d 1367, 1370 (Utah 1983). Prior decisions by this Court have often failed to
distinguish the analysis of the accident
question from the discussion of causation
elements.2 As a result, this Court and the
Commission are faced with confusing and
often inconsistent precedent. For this rea-

son we now undertake a fresh look at the
polky TKA historiral background of the
workers' compensation statute in an attempt to provide a clear and workable rule
for future application by the Commission.
I.
The term "by accident" is not defined in
the workers' compensation statutes. The
most frequently referenced authority for
the definition of "by accident" is the case
of Carling v. Industrial Commission, 16
Utah 2d 260, 399 P.2d 202 (1965), where the
term was defined as follows:
[An accident] connotes an unanticipated,
unintended occurrence different from
what would normally be expected to occur in the usual course of events
[T]his is not necessarily restricted to
some single incident which happened suddenly at one particular time and does not
preclude tte possibility that dvte to exertion, stress or other repetitive cause, a
climax might be reached in such manner
as to properly fall within the definition of
an accident as just stated above. However, such an occurrence must be distinguished from gradually developing conditions which are classified as occupational
diseases
Id. at 261-62, 399 P.2d at 203 (citing Jones
v. California Packing Corp., 121 Utah
612, 616, 244 P.2d 640, 642 (1952), and
Purity Biscuit Co. v. Industrial Commission, 115 Utah 1, 201 P.2d 961 (1949)).
Some confusion has developed as to whether "by accident" requires proof of an unusual event. This issue frequently arises
when the employee suffers an internal failure 3 brought about by exertions in the

stantive support in the record." Id at 726 (foot2. We note that many of our prior opinions so
notes omfttedY See aiso Church of Jesus Christ
mtexmingitd \ht causation and accident anafyof Latter-Day Saints v. Industrial Comm'n, 590
ses that it is impossible to segregate them and
P.2d 328, 329-30 (Utah 1979); Pintar v. Industridetermine the basis for the Court's decision.
For example, the opinion in Sabo's Elec. Serv. v. al Comm'n, 14 Utah 2d 276r 382 P.2d 414 (1963).
For an example of an opinion which does sepaSabo, 642 P.2d 722 (Utah 1982). mixes the accirate the accident and causation analysis, see
dent and causation elements in the following
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
language: 'It appears to be mere coincidence
that defendant's injury ... occurred at work.
Industrial Comm'n, 590 P.2d 328. 330-31 (Utah
Defendant bears the burden of showing other1979) (Wiikins, J., dissenting).
wise. Proof of the causal relationship of duties
of employment to unexpected injury is simply 3. An "internal failure" refers to a category of
injuries that arise from general organ or struclacking
[T]he Commission's conclusion
tural failure brought about by an exertion in the
that an accident occurred is without any sub-
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workplace. It is clear, however, that our
cases have defined "by accident" to include
internal failures resulting from both usual
and unusual exertions. See Schmidt v.
Industrial Commission, 617 P.2d 693, 695
(Utah 1980).
This Court first discussed the term "by
accident" in Tintic Milling Co, v. Industrial Commission, 60 Utah 14, 206 P. 278
(1922), where an accident was said to be
"something out of the ordinary, unexpected, and definitely located as to time
and place." 60 Utah at 22, 206 P. at 281.
This definition was used to distinguish injuries which occurred gradually and were
covered under statutory provisions for occupational disease. Id. The Court in Tintic Milling also acknowledged that where
the claimant suffers an internal failure the
"unexpected result" rule of the seminal
English case of Fenton v. Thorley, [1903]
A.C. 443, 72 L.J.K. 789, 5 W.C.C. 1, is
appropriate. The Court in Tintic Milling
observed:
"Since the case of Fenton v. Thorley,
nothing more is required than that the
harm that the plaintiff has sustained
shall be unexpected
It is enough
that the causes, themselves known and
usual, should produce a result which on
a particular occasion is neither designed
nor expected. The test as to whether an
injury is unexpected, and so, if received
on a single occasion, occurs 'by accident,'
is that the sufferer did not intend or
expect that injury would on that particular occasion result from what he was
doing."
60 Utah at 26, 206 P. at 282 (quoting Bohlen, A Problem in The Drafting of Workmen 's Compensation Acts, 25 Harv.L.Rev.
328, 340 (1912) (emphasis added)). Accordingly, the Court in Tintic affirmed a finding that the employee, whose previous respiratory problems were aggravated by entering a roasting flue, had suffered a compensable accident.

After Tintic Milling, the Court temporarily rejected the "unexpected result" definition of Fenton v. Thorley in internal
failure cases on the ground that the definition of "by accident" required an unusual
occurrence or exertion. In Bamberger v.
Industrial Commission, 66 Utah 203, 240
P. 1103 (1925), the Court denied compensation to a worker who unexpectedly suffered a heart attack while manually unloading a railroad car of coal on the ground
that no overexertion occurred during the
work. 66 Utah at 208, 240 P. at 1104.
That decision was apparently overruled,
however, when the Court embraced the
"unexpected result" rule and awarded compensation to an employee who suffered a
heart attack after overexertions while routinely cleaning the weirs to a city reservoir.
Hammond v. Industrial Commission, 84
Utah 67, 87, 34 P.2d 687, 695 (1934) (Moffat, J., concurring). Hammond was followed in Columbia Steel Co. v. Industrial
Commission, 92 Utah 72, 66 P.2d 124
(1937), where a unanimous Court held that
the employee, who had suffered a ruptured
aorta from riding a caterpillar tractor over
rough ground, suffered an injury "by accident" since the result was "an unusual,
unforeseen, and unexpected event or occurrence" and definite as to time and place.
Id. at 92, 66 P.2d at 134. And, in Thomas
D. Dee Memorial Hospital Ass'n. v. Industrial Commission, 104 Utah 61, 138 P.2d
233 (1943), the Court sustained an award of
benefits to a claimant who had suffered
from heart disease and experienced a heart
attack shortly after moving 52 boxes
weighing 50 to 100 pounds and 28 sacks of
fire clay—work that was unusually heavy
and greatly in excess of his ordinary
duties. The Court pointed out in dicta,
that the English common law would have
awarded compensation even if the exertions were ordinary and usually required as
part of the job. 104 Utah at 67-71, 138
P.2d at 235-39. Quoting from the Bohlen
article, supra, the Court observed:

workplace. Internal failure claims evaluated by
this Court include heart attacks, hernias, and
back injuries. See generally, Mote, Schmidt v.
Industrial Commission and Injury Compensabili-

ty under Utah Worker's Compensation Law: A
Just Result or Just Another "Living Corpse"?,
1981 Utah LRev. 393.
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"[Nothing more is required than that
the harm that the plaintiff has sustained
shall be unexpected
The element of
unexpectedness inherent in the word 'accident1 is sufficiently supplied . . . if,
though the act is usual and the conditions normal, it causes a harm unforeseen by him who suffers it"
104 Utah at 70, 138 P.2d at 237.
Six years later in Purity Biscuit Co. v.
Industrial Commission, 115 Utah 1, 201
P.2d 961 (1949), this Court explicitly
adopted the English rule for the definition
of an accident and awarded benefits to a
claimant who unexpectedly injured his back
while stepping on the brake pedal of a
delivery truck—a usual and ordinary activity. See 115 Utah 14-20, 201 P.2d 967-70.
After summarizing early Utah cases interpreting "by accident" the Court concluded
that "since 1922 this court has uniformly
held that an unexpected internal failure
meets the requirements of ["by accident"]

and the legislature by failing to amend has
acquiesced in that construction." 115 Utah
at 15, 201 P.2d at 968.
The holding of Purity Biscuit also
squarely embraced the concept that an ordinary or usual exertion that results in an
unexpected injury is compensable. See 115
Utah at 18-19, 201 P. at 969-70. After
carefully considering the legislative purpose of the workers' compensation statute,
prior precedent, and public policy, the
Court rejected the requirement that proof
of an unusual activity or exertion be a
required element of the "by accident" definition. 115 Utah at 14-20, 201 P.2d at
967-70. The Court concluded that "there
is nothing in the statute which would justify a holding that an injury is compensable
where overexertion is shown but is not
compensable where only ordinary exertion
is shown, provided that in both cases it is
shown that the exertion causes the injury." 4 115 Utah at 19, 201 P.2d at 970.

4. The holding of Purity Biscuit was questioned
in Mellen v. Industrial Comm'n, 19 Utah 2d 373,
431 P.2d 798 (1967), where the opinion erroneously stated that Purity Biscuit "has never been
cited by this or any other court to support the
law of that case." 19 Utah 2d at 375, 431 ?2d at
799. In fact, by 1967 Purity Biscuit had been
relied upon in decisions from the courts of nine
other states. Alabama Textiles Prods. Corp. v.
Grantham, 263 Ala. 179, 183-84, 82 So.2d 204,
208 (1955) (finding of unusual strain or exertion
unnecessary to support conclusion that claimant
suffered injury by accident); Bryant Stave &
Heading Co. v. White, 227 Ark. 147, 151-52, 296
S.W.2d 436, 439-40 (1956) (Purity Biscuit cited
as stating majority position that usual exertion
causing an internal failure may be by accident);
Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n,
231 Cal.App.2d HI. 41 CaLRptr. 628, 635 (1964)
(relying upon causation rule of Purity Biscuit);
Spivey v. Battaglia Fruit Co., 138 So2d 308, 314
(Fla.1962) (back herniation from rupture of intervertebral disc satisfies statutory requirement
of suddenness); Roman v. Minneapolis SL Ry.t
268 Minn. 367, 380, 129 N.W.2d 550, 559 (1964)
(calls Purity Biscuit "a well-considered workmen's compensation case" that supported an
award where many factors led to the disability);
Murphy v. Anaconda Co., 133 Mont 198, 208,
321 P.2d 1094, 1100 (1958) (quoting favorably
the reliance on Purity Biscuit in Bryant Stave,
227 Ark. at 151-52, 296 S.W.2d at 439-40. and
holding that a usual exertion may lead to a
compensable injury where the causal relationship is established); Neylon v. Ford Motor Co.,
10 NJ. 325, 327-28, 91 A.2d 569, 570 (1952) (Al-
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rity Biscuit cited in support of rule that internal
failure from ordinary or usual exertion is an
"injury by accident"); Olson v. State Indust
Accident Comm'n, 222 Or. 407, 416-17, 352 P.2d
1096, 1101 (1960) (O'Connell, J., specially concurring) (dissent to Purity Biscuit quoted); Coo*
per v. Vinatieri, 73 S.D. 418, 424, 43 N.W.2d 747,
750-51 (1950) (Purity Biscuit cited as an example of the divergent viewpoints for defining a
compensable accident).
In addition, the decision in Purity Biscuit was
relied upon by the majority in three Utah cases.
See Jones v. California Packing Co., 121 Utah
612, 244 P.2d 640, 642; Carling v. Industrial
Commission, 16 Utah 2d 260, 399 ?2& 202;
Powers v. Industrial Commission, 19 Utah 2d
140, 427 P.2d 740. Despite this support for the
decision in Purity Biscuit, the Court in Mellen
concluded without further discussion that "(t]he
Purity Biscuit decision certainly needs a healthy
reappraisement" 19 Utah 2d at 376, 431 ?2d at
800. Two years later in Redman Warehousing
Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 22 Utah 2d 398, 454
P.2d 283 (1969), the Court again questioned the
Purity Biscuit decision in a superficial analysis
that concluded: "Purity enjoys the unique and
doubtful distinction of being a living corpse."
22 Utah 2d at 403, 454 P.2d at 286. After
considering those cases from Utah and other
jurisdictions that have relied on Purity Biscuit,
we now cannot agree that it was a "living
corpse." Moreover, even if Purity Biscuit lay
dormant, it was resurrected by Schmidt v. Industrial Commission, 617 P.2d 693, 695 (Utah
1980).
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Since Purity Biscuit, numerous cases
have held that an internal injury may be
compensable if it results from either a
usual or unusual exertion in the course of
employment. See, e.g., Champion Home
Builders v. Industrial Commission, 703
P.2d 306 (Utah 1985) (perforated ulcer
caused by lifting an unusually heavy
beam); Pittsburg Testing Laboratories v.
Keller, 657 P.2d at 1367 (unforeseen and
unanticipated heart attack resulting from
exertion while inspecting roof structure);
Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Monfredi, 631 P.2d
888 (Utah 1981) (back injur}' resulting from
shoveling coal compensable despite usualness of activity and presence of preexisting
conditions); Painter Motor v. Ostler, 617
P.2d 975 (Utah 1980) (back injury resulting
from moving heavy boxes and installing
electrical equipment); Schmidt v. Industrial Commission, 617 P.2d 693 (Utah 1980)
(back injury resulting from carrying steel
plates compensable despite prior history of
back disorders and ordinary activity);
United States Steel Corp. v. Draper, 613
P.2d 508 (Utah 1980) (heart attack resulting from exertion while rushing to drowning accident); IGA Food Fair v. Martin,
584 P.2d 828 (Utah 1978) (heart attack resulting from heavy lifting); Nuzum v. Roosendahl Construction & Mining Corp.,
565 P.2d 1144 (Utah 1977) (truck driver
suffered heart attack after repeatedly
climbing long steps); Residential & Commercial Construction Co. v. Industrial
Commission, 529 P.2d 427 (Utah 1974)
(back injury resulting from moving lumber); Powers v. Industrial Commission,
19 Utah 2d 140, 427 P.2d 740 (1967) (heart
distress occurring over a period of several
months compensable despite preexisting
conditions); Baker v. Industrial Commission, 17 Utah 2d 141, 405 P.2d 613 (1965)
(back injury resulting from filing papers in
lower drawer compensable).
Despite the strong precedential support
for applying the "unexpected result" rule
of Purity Biscuit to internal failure cases,
a separate line of opposing authority has
developed which requires overexertion or
an unusual event to prove an injury occurred "by accident." Typically, these

cases denied compensation because the
claimants' ordinary work duties precipitated the injury. Consequently, there were no
events or exertions that were unusual or
extraordinary to qualify as "by accident/'
See, e.g., Billings Computer Corp. v. Tarango, 674 P.2d 104 (Utah 1983) (compensation for knee injury denied where circumstances precipitating the injury were commonplace and usual); Sabo's Electronic
Service v. Sabo, 642 P.2d 722 (Utah 1982)
(back injury from loading box of twelve
radios into van not compensable); Farmer's Grain Cooperative v. Mason, 606 P.2d
237 (Utah 1980) (back injury to claimant
with preexisting condition resulting from
delivery of 100-pound sacks not compensable since the activity was not unusual or
unexpected); Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints v. Industrial Commission, 590 P.2d 328 (Utah 1979) (back injury
suffered by janitor upon standing up not
compensable without evidence that activities were unusual); Redman Warehousing
Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 22 Utah
2d 398, 454 P.2d 283 (1969) (back injury
precipitated by sitting and driving a moving van not compensable without proof of
an unusual event). These cases will not be
collectively referred to as the Redman line
of cases.
[2] We are now convinced that the Redman line of cases has misconstrued the
historical and logical definition of "by accident" The Redman line of cases relied on
the following abridged version of the definition of an accident found in Carling v.
Industrial Commission: "[Accident] connotes an unanticipated, unintended occurrence different from what would normally be expected to occur in the usual
course of events.'1 16 Utah at 261, 399
P.2d at 203 (emphasis added; footnotes
omitted). In Redman, the highlighted
phrase was interpreted to require an unusual event before there can be an accident This interpretation misconstrues the
Carling decision itself and is inconsistent
with the English definition of "by accident"
used by this Court since 1922. The key
requirement of an accident under the Car-
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ling decision, as well as prior decisions,
was that the occurrence be unanticipated,
unplanned and unintended. The highlighted phrase emphasized that where either the
cause of the injury or the result of an
exertion was different from what would
normally be expected to occur, the occurrence was unplanned, unforeseen, unintended and therefore "by accident."
Policy considerations also militate in favor of rejecting the notion that the phrase
"by accident" requires an unusual event.
There is nothing in the term "accident"
that suggests that only that which is unusual is accidental. See Robertson v. Industrial Commission, 109 Utah at 33, 40,
163 P.2d at 335, 338 (Wade, J., concurring;
Wolfe, J., dissenting). An accident does
not occur simply because a worker is injured during an unusual activity. This argument is illustrated by Professor Larson
in his treatise on workmen's compensation
with the following example:
If an employee intentionally and knowingly undertakes to lift an unusual load,
the cause (i.e., the lifting) is no more
accidental than if he deliberately lifted a
normal load. Or if a gardener deliberately continues to mow the lawn in the rain,
a passerby observing him would not say
that he was undergoing an accident
merely because it is unusual to mow
lawns in the rain.
Larson, Workmen's Compensation § 38.62, at 7-162 (1986) (footnotes omitted).
Larson also criticizes the usual-unusual
distinction as being unworkable in practice.
Realistically, it is impossible to determine
what are the usual and normal requirements of a job. People work in good
weather and bad, lift heavy items as well
as light ones, and work for long hours as
well as short ones. None of these activities may be unusual or unexpected. Id.
§ 38.63 at 7-164 to -168.
The unworkability of the usual-unusual
event requirement is further evidenced by
comparing seemingly irreconcilable decisions by this Court Compare Kaiser
Steel v. Monfredi 631 P.2d 888 (back injury to miner Math previous back problems
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held to be a compensable accident despite
being caused by shoveling coal in the usual
course of employment), with Farmer's
Grain Cooperative v. Mason, 606 P.2d 237
(no accident where worker with previous
back problems sustained back injury while
delivering 100-pound bags of whey); compare Baker v. Industrial Commission, 17
Utah 2d 141, 405 P.2d 613 (compensable
accident for back injury resulting from filing paper in lower drawer) with Billings
Computer Corp. v. Tarangof 674 P.2d 104
(no accident where worker sustained knee
injury resulting from bending to pick up
small parts).
[3,4] We believe that the Court's real
concern in the Redman line of cases was
the presence or absence of proof of causation to support an award of compensation.
See generally Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints, 590 P.2d at 332 (Wilkins, J., dissenting). As will be discussed
in the next section, the Court has developed
two parallel lines of authority on the causation issue, one of which requires an unusual event in order to meet the statutory
causation requirement Although proof of
an unusual event may be helpful in determining causation, it is not required as an
element of "by accident" in section 35-145. "[TJhe basic and indispensable ingredient of 'accident' is unexpectedness."
Schmidt, 617 P.2d at 696 (Wilkins, J., concurring) (quoting IB Larson, Workmen's
Compensation, at 7-5 (1980). We therefore reaffirm those cases which hold that
an accident is an unexpected or unintended
occurrence that may be either the cause or
the result of an injury. We thus necessarily abandon the analysis of "by accident" in
the Redman line of cases which predicates
the "accident" determination upon the occurrence of an unusual event
II.
The second element of a compensable
accident requires proof of a causal connection between the injury and the worker's
employment duties. Pittsburg Testing
Laboratory v. Keller, 657 P.2d 1367, 1370
(Utah 1983). In workers' compensation
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cases involving internal failures, the key
issue is usually one of causation. Ordinarily, causation is proved by the production
and interpretation of medical evidence either alone or together with other evidence.
See Keller, 657 P.2d at 1367, 1370;
Schmidt v. Industrial Commission, 617
P.2d 693, 695 (Utah 1980). Because of the
difficulties of diagnosis of internal failures
and because of the possibility that a preexisting condition may have contributed to
the injury, special causation rules have
been developed for internal failure cases.
See Larson, supra, § 38.81, at 7-269; Purity Biscuit Co. v. Industrial Commission, 115 Utah 1, 20-21, 201 P.2d 970-71
(Wolfe, J., concurring specially).
This Court initially responded to the
problem of causation in internal failure
cases by suggesting that the Commission
use a clear and convincing evidence standard when an internal failure was caused
by an exertion in the workplace.5 See
Thomas D. Dee Memorial Hospital Ass'n.
v. Industrial Commission, 104 Utah 61,
74, 138 P.2d 233, 238 (1943). The clear and
convincing evidence standard was rejected,
however, in Lipman v. Industrial Commission, 592 P.2d 616, 618 (Utah 1979),
with the rationale that such a standard
would make workers' compensation benefits nearly impossible to recover where the
deceased suffered from a preexisting condition. Accordingly, the standard to prove
causal connection is preponderance of the
evidence. Id.
The second method that has been used to
ensure causal connection in internal failure
cases is to require proof that an unusual
event or activity precipitated the injury.
Presumably, this requirement was used to
prevent compensating a person predisposed
to internal failure where the preexisting
condition contributed more to the injury
than his usual work activity. The following internal failure cases illustrate that evidence of an unusual event or activity is
necessary to prove causation. Billings
5. In Nebraska, an enhanced standard of proof is
still used where the employee suffers from a
preexisting condition. See Mann v. City of

Computer Corp. v. Tarango, 674 P.2d 104,
106-07 (Utah 1983); Sabo's Electronic Service v. Sabo, 642 P.2d 722, 726 n. 12 (Utah
1982); Church of Jesus Christ of LatterDay Saints v. Industrial Commission,
590 P.2d 328, 329 (Utah 1979); IGA Food
Fair v. Martin, 584 P.2d 828, 829 (Utah
1978); Nuzum v. Roosendahl Construction & Mining Corp., 565 P.2d 1144, 1146
(Utah 1977); Jones v. California Packing
Corp., 121 Utah 612, 244 P.2d 640 (1952);
Robertson v. Industrial Commission, 109
Utah 25, 163 P.2d 331 (1945); Thomas D.
Dee Memorial Hospital Ass'n v. Industrial Commission, 104 Utah 61, 138 P.2d at
233; see Schmidt, 617 P.2d at 697-99
(Crockett, J., dissenting); Farmer's Grain
Cooperative v. Mason, 606 P.2d 237, 23839 (Utah 1980); Mellen v. Industrial Commission, 19 Utah 2d 373, 374, 431 P.2d 798,
799 (1967); Purity Biscuit, 115 Utah at 30,
201 P.2d at 975 (Latimer, J., dissenting).
Defendants argue that any rule that
awards compensation based on usual exertion will open the floodgates for payment
of benefits for all internal injuries that
coincidentally occur at work. They claim
that the unusual exertion requirement is
necessary to prevent the employer from
becoming a general insurer. They argue
that without the unusual exertion rule, employment opportunities for persons with a
history or indication of physical disability
or handicap will be reduced.
Despite precedent supporting the "unusual exertion" rule, the claimant urges us
to follow a separate line of authority that
awards compensation for injuries that occur during usual and ordinary workplace
activity. These cases typically award compensation where the claimant was engaged
in a workplace activity and where there is
adequate evidence of medical causation.
See, e.g., Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Monfredi,
631 P.2d 888 (Utah 1981) (award for compensation affirmed for a coal miner's back
injury despite absence of unusual incident);
Schmidt v. Industrial Commission, 617
P.2d at 695 (compensation awarded for
Omaha, 211 Neb. 583. 592, 319 N.W^d 454, 458
(1982).
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back injuries arising from ordinary duties
upon proof of medical causal connection
between workplace exertions and the injury); Residential and Commercial Construction Co. v. Industrial Commission,
529 P.2d 427 (Utah 1974) (carpenter's back
injury from lifting, bending, and twisting in
the ordinary course of work compensable);
Powers v. Industrial Commission, 19
Utah 2d 140, 427 P.2d 740, 742 (1967)
(awarding compensation to fireman for exertions in the normal course of employment—the Court rejecting the unusual exertion test in favor of ordinary exertion);
Baker v. Industrial Commission, 17 Utah
2d 141, 405 P.2d 613 (1965) (back injury
from filing papers in lower drawer of cabinet compensable); Purity Biscuit Co. v.
Industrial Commission, 115 Utah 1, 201
P.2d 961 (1949). Although the usual exertion rule was questioned in Mellen v. Industrial Commission, 19 Utah 2d at 37576, 431 P.2d at 800, that decision failed to
explicitly overrule the usual exertion line of
cases. Moreover, Residential and Commercial Construction Co., Schmidt, and
Kaiser Steel have awarded compensation
for usual workplace activity after the Mellen decision. Clearly, the usual exertion
rule is not simply an aberration in Utah
law.
When read in chronological sequence,
our opinions demonstrate an inconsistent
and confused approach to determining
when an accident arose out of or in the
course of employment Much of this confusion can be traced to fundamental problems stemming from the use of the usualunusual distinction as a means of proving
causation. Larson criticizes the unusual
exertion requirement by itself as a "clumsy
and ill-fitting device with which to ensure
causal connection/' Larson, supra, § 38.81, at 7-270. The problems in determining
what activities were usual or unusual were
6. Larson's observation is consistent with this
Court's rationale for rejecting the unusual exertion requirement in Purity Biscuit, 115 Utah at
16, 201 P.2d at 968:
[I]f [overexertion] is the test no one will ever
know what this court will consider sufficient
overexertion. Also under that test if the work

EXHIBIT

recognized as long ago as 1949 when Justice Wolfe wrote that a "Pandora's box of
difficulties . . . may be opened by the refinements between usual and unusual, exertion and overexertion, ordinary and extraordinary exertion measured by the individual involved or by the industrial function performed by him or both." Purity
Biscuit, 115 Utah at 23, 201 P.2d at 972
(Wolfe, J., concurring specially). The contents of the Pandora's box feared by Justice Wolfe are now evident in the plethora
of our cases struggling with a definition of
a compensable accident based upon the
usualness or ordinariness of an activity.
Professor Larson has also criticized the
usual-unusual distinction because the ordinariness of the activity fails to consider
that some occupations routinely require a
usual exertion capable of causing injury.
Likewise, other occupations, such as deskwork, require so little physical effort that
an "unusual exertion" may be insufficient
to prove that the resulting accident arose
out of the employment Larson, supra,
§ 38.81, at 7-270.6
[5] Because we find the present use of
the usual-unusual distinction unhelpful and
our prior precedent inconsistent, we take
this opportunity to examine an alternative
causation analysis that may better meet
the objectives of the workers' compensation laws. We are mindful that the key
question in determining causation is whether, given this body and this exertion, the
exertion in fact contributed to the injury.
Id § 38.82, at 7-271; Purity Biscuit, 115
Utah at 23, 201 P.2d at 972 (Wolfe, J.f
concurring specially).
[6] The language "arising out of or in
the course of his employment" found in
U.C.A., 1953, § 35-1-45 (Supp.1986), was
apparently intended to ensure that compensation is only awarded where there is a
usually required by the job is so great that it
would break the strongest man even he will
not be able to recover. But if it is more than
usual exertion which causes the injury the
employee can recover no matter how light the
work is which causes the injury.
Id.
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sufficient causal connection between the
disability and the working conditions. The
causation requirement makes it necessary
to distinguish those injuries which (a) coincidentally occur at work because a preexisting condition results in symptoms which
appear during work hours without any enhancement from the workplace, and (b)
those injuries which occur because some
condition or exertion required by the employment increases the risk of injury which
the worker normally faces in his everyday
life. See Bryant v. Masters Machine Co.,
444 A.2d 329, 337 (Me.1982). Only the
latter type of injury is compensable under
U.C.A., 1953, § 35-1-45. There is no fixed
formula by which the causation issue may
be resolved, and the issue must be determined on the facts of each case.
[7] Professor Larson has suggested a
two-part causation test which is consistent
with the purpose of our workers' compensation laws and helpful in determining causation. We therefore adopt that test Larson suggests that compensable injuries can
best be identified by first considering the
legal cause of the injury and then its medical cause. Larson, supra, § 38.83(a), at
7-273. "Under the legal test, the law must
define what kind of exertion satisfies the
test of 'arising out of the employment' . . .
[then] the doctors must say whether the
exertion (having been held legally sufficient to support compensation) in fact
7. Cases from other jurisdictions which have accepted the dual-causation standard suggested by
Larson include: Market Foods Distribs., Inc. v.
Levenson, 383 So.2d 726 (Fla.DistCLApp.1980)
(claimant with preexisting spinal disease denied
compensation where injury could have been
triggered at any time during normal movement
and exertion at work not greater than typical
nonemployment exertion); Guidry v. Sline Indus. Painters, Inc., 418 So2d 626 (La. 1982)
(claimant granted compensation where injury
resulted from stress, exertion, and strain greater
than that in everyday nonemployment life);
Bryant v. Masters Mack Co., 444 K2& 329 (Me.
1982) (claimant with preexisting condition
awarded compensation for back injury resulting
from fall from his stool at work because of
increased risk of failing where employees
moved around him at work); Barrett v. Herbert
Eng'g, Inc., 371 A.2d 633 (Me.1977) (claimant
with preexisting back condition denied compen-

caused this [injury]/'7 Larson, supra,
§ 38.83(a). at 7-276 to -277.
[8] 1. Legal Cause—Whether an injury arose out of or in the course of employment is difficult to determine where the
employee brings to the workplace a personal element of risk such as a preexisting
condition. Just because a person suffers a
preexisting condition, he or she is not disqualified from obtaining compensation.
Our cases make clear that "the aggravation or lighting up of a pre-existing disease
by an industrial accident is compensable
" Powers v. Industrial Commission, 19 Utah 2d 140, 143-44, 427 P.2d 740,
743 (1967) (footnote omitted). To meet the
legal causation requirement, a claimant
with a preexisting condition must show
that the employment contributed something substantial to increase the risk he
already faced in everyday life because of
his condition. This additional element of
risk in the workplace is usually supplied by
an exertion greater than that undertaken in
normal, everyday life. This extra exertion
serves to offset the preexisting condition of
the employee as a likely cause of the injury, thereby eliminating claims for impairments resulting from a personal risk rather
than exertions at work. Larson, supra,
§ 38.83(b), at 7-278. Larson summarized
how the legal cause rule would work in
practice as follows:
sation for injury resulting from working at normal gait since there was no work-related enhancement of personal risk); Mann v. City of
Omaha, 211 Neb. 583, 319 N.W.2d 454 (1982)
(policeman with history of heart disease awarded compensation for heart attack at home
where claimant's physician testified that attack
was caused by stress of police work rather than
personal risk factors); SeUens v. Allen Prods.
Co., 206 Neb. 506, 293 N.W.2d 415 (1980)
(claimant with preexisting heart problems denied compensation for heart attack suffered
while unloading 28-pound cases from truck
trailer despite sedentary nonworking lifestyle
using objective standard of average worker in
nonemployment life); Couture v. Mammoth
Groceries, Inc., 116 N.H. 181. 355 AJ2d 421
(1976) (claimant with no preexisting heart problems awarded benefits upon proof that lifting
beef medically caused the fatal heart attack).
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If there is some personal causal contri*
bution in the form of a [preexisting condition], the employment contribution
must take the form of an exertion great*
er than that of nonemployment life
If there is no personal causal contribution, that is, if there is no prior weakness
or disease, any exertion connected with
the employment and causally connected
with the [injury] as a matter of medical
fact is adequate to satisfy the legal test
of causation.
Id. Thus, where the claimant suffers from
a preexisting condition which contributes to
the injury, an unusual or extraordinary exertion is required to prove legal causation.
Where there is no preexisting condition, a
usual or ordinary exertion is sufficient.8

v. National Gypsum Co., 348 So.2d 497,
499 (AlauCiv.App.1977) (employment risk
must be " 'a danger or risk materially in
excess of that to which people not so emf
ployed are exposed
" Quoting from
City of Tuscaloosa v. Howard, 55 Ala.App.
701, 70S-06, 318 So.2d 729, 732 (1975)).
But see Market Foods Distributors, Inc. v.
Levenson, 383 So.2d 726, 727 (Fla.DistCt
App.1980) (subjective test "the employment must involve an exertion greater than
that normally performed by the employee
during his non-employment life"). Thus,
the precipitating exertion must be compared with the usual wear and tear and
exertions of nonemployment life, not the
nonemployment life of the particular worker.

[9] We also accept Larson's suggestion
that the comparison between the usual and
unusual exertion be defined according to an
objective standard. "Note that the comparison is not with this employee's usual
exertion in his employment but with the
exertions of normal nonemployment life of
this or any other person." Larson, supra,
§ 38.83(b), at 7-279 (emphasis in original).
See also Johns-Manville Products v. Industrial Commission, 78 I11.2d 171,178, 35
Ill.Dec. 540, 544, 399 N.E.2d 606, 610 (1979)
(compensation denied where the risk of the
employment activity "is no greater than
that to which he would have been exposed
had he not been so employed"); Strickland

We believe an objective standard of comparison will provide a more consistent and
predictable standard for the Commission
and this Court to follow. In evaluating
typical nonemployment activity, the focus
is on what typical nonemployment activities
are generally expected of people in today's
society, not what this particular claimant is
accustomed to doing. Typical activities
and exertions expected of men and women
in the latter part of the 20th century, for
example, include taking full garbage cans
to the street, lifting and carrying baggage
for travel, changing a flat tire on an automobile, lifting a small child to chest height,
and climbing the stairs in buildings. By

8. Larson highlights the difference between the
unusual-usual exertion test with the rule we
today adopt with the following examples of extreme cases in the heart attack area:
Suppose X's job involves frequent lifting of
200-pound bags, and one such 200-pound lift
medically produces a heart attack. Under the
old unusual-exertion rule there would be no
compensation, regardless of previous heart
condition. Under the suggested rule there
would be compensation, even in the presence
of a history of heart disease, because people
generally do not lift 200-pound weights as a
part of nonemployment life, and therefore
this episode cannot be ascribed to the ordinary wear and tear of life.
Suppose Y*s job involves no lifting. Suppose he lifts a 20-pound weight on the job,
and suppose there is medical testimony that
this lift caused his heart attack. Under the
old test, exclusively concerned with the com-

parison between this employee's usual exertions and the precipitating exertion, there
would be compensation. Under the suggested
rule the result would depend on whether
there was a personal causal element in the
form of a previously weakened heart If
there was not, compensation would be awarded, since the employment contributed something and the employee's personal life nothing
to the cause of the collapse. If there was [a
previously weakened heart], compensation
would be denied in spite of the medical causal
contribution, because legally the personal
causal contribution was substantial, while the
employment added nothing to the usual wear
and tear of life—which certainly includes lifting objects weighing 20 pounds such as bags
of golf clubs, minnow pails, and step ladders.
Larson, supra, § 38.83, at 7-280-81 (footnote
omitted).
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using an objective standard, the case law
will eventually define a standard for typical
"nonemployment activity" in much the way
case law has developed the standard of
care for the reasonable man in tort law.
[10] 2. Medical Cause—The second
part of Larson's dual-causation test requires that the claimant prove the disability
is medically the result of an exertion or
injury that occurred during a work-related
activity. The purpose of the medical cause
test is to ensure that there is a medically
demonstrable causal link between the
work-related exertions and the unexpected
injuries that resulted from those strains.
The medical causal requirement will prevent an employer from becoming a general
insurer of his employees and discourage
fraudulent claims.
With the issue being one primarily of
causation, the importance of the . . .
medical panel becomes manifest. It is
through the expertise of the medical panel that the Commission should be able to
make the determination of whether the
injury sustained by a claimant is causally
connected or contributed to by the claimant's employment.
Schmidt, 617 P.2d at 697 (Wilkins, J., concurring). Under the medical cause test, the
claimant must show by evidence, opinion,
or otherwise that the stress, strain, or exertion required by his or her occupation led to
the resulting injury or disability. In the
event the claimant cannot show a medical
causal connection, compensation should be
denied.9
III.
[11] We now undertake to apply the
foregoing analysis to the case before us.
In reviewing findings of fact of the Industrial Commission, we determine whether
there is substantial evidence to support the
Commission's findings. Champion Home
9. Evidence of the ordinariness or usualness of
the employee's exertions may be relevant to the
medical conclusion of causal connection.
Where the injury results from latent symptoms
with an illness such as heart disease, proof of
medical causation may be especially difficult.
Larson's treatise cites many examples of cases

Builders v. Industrial Commission, 703
P.2d 306, 307 (Utah 1985).
[12] We have previously stated that the
key element of whether an injury occurred
"by accident" is whether the injury was
unexpected. After reviewing the record,
we find no substantial evidence that the
injury was not unexpected. It is clear
from the uncontradicted testimony of the
claimant that he experienced an unexpected
and unanticipated injury to his back as he
lifted a crate of milk in the cramped area of
the cooler. Although the claimant had injured his back on prior jobs, he had not
complained of pain or limitations at his job
with Kent's Foods. There is no evidence
which indicates that this injury was predictable or that it developed gradually as with
an occupational disease or progressive back
disorder. While the employer's report of
injury and the medical records do not corroborate that a sudden and identifiable injury occurred in the cooler, the reports are
unhelpful in determining whether the injury was unexpected.
It appears that the administrative law
judge applied the "unusual event or trauma" rule in defining an accident. We have
rejected that test in lieu of a test based on
unexpectedness. Moreover, the administrative law judge's emphasis on prior injuries is not determinative of whether an
accident occurred. We have previously
held that the aggravation or "lighting up"
of a preexisting condition by an internal
failure is a compensable accident Powers
v. Industrial Commission, 19 Utah 2d 140,
143, 427 P.2d 740, 743 (1967). We conclude
therefore that the decision of the Commission that the claimant's injury was not "by
accident" was not based on the evidence,
and that decision is, therefore, erroneous.
[13] The key issue in this case, like
most internal failure cases, is whether the
injury "arose out of or in the course of
where compensation claims were defeated because of inadequate proof of medical causation.
See Larson, supra, § 38.83(i), at 7-319 to -321.
Compare Guidry v. Sline Indus. Painters, Inc.,
418 So.2d 626 (La. 1982) (heart attack triggered
by stress, exertion, and strain greater than sedentary life of average worker compensable).
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employment." Since the claimant had previous back problems, to meet the legal causation requirement he must show that moving and lifting several piles of dairy products weighing thirty to fifty pounds in the
confined area of the cooler exceeded the
exertion that the average person typically
undertakes in nonemployment life. The evidence presented by the claimant was insufficient for us to make a determination regarding legal causation. It is unclear from
the record how many crates were moved by
the claimant, the distance the crates were
moved, the precise weight of the crates,
and the size of the area in which the lifting
and moving took place. Because the claimant did not have the benefit of the foregoing opinion, we remand for further factfinding on this issue.
Moreover, the record is insufficient to
show medical causation. It is unclear from
the medical reports whether the doctors
were aware of the specific incident in the
cooler. Further, the case was not submitted to a medical panel for its evaluation.
Without sufficient evidence of medical causation, we are unable to determine whether
there is a medically demonstrable causal
link between the lift in the cooler and the
injury to the claimant's back. We therefore remand to the Industrial Commission
for additional evidence and findings on the
question of medical causation.
The decision of the Commission is vacated and remanded.
HOWE and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur.
HALL, Chief Justice: (concurring and
dissenting).
1 concur in remanding this case to the
Commission for the purpose of determining
1. Powers v. Industrial Comm'n, 19 Utah 2d 140,
145-44, 427 P.2d 740, 743 (1967).
2. 115 Utah 1, 201 P.2d 961 (1949).

whether the work incident aggravated a
preexisting condition such as would warrant an award of compensation.1 However,
I do not join the Court in adopting an
"unexpected result" standard to be applied
in determining the existence of a compensable accident
I do not believe that this Court has "misconstrued the historical and logical" definition of "by accident" in the bulk of its
recent cases concerning the issue at bar.
The majority's reliance upon Purity Biscuit Co. v. Industrial Commission1 is
misplaced. The holding therein is without
precedential value because it has been simply ignored.3 The only case in which this
Court followed Purity Biscuit is Schmidt
v. Industrial Commission,4 which support
is similarly without precedential value because it has also been ignored beginning
with Painter Motor Co. v. Ostler,5 the very
next accident case handed down. In that
case, the Court cited and relied upon Carling v. Industrial Commission * and again
defined "accident" as an unanticipated,
unintended occurrence different from what
would normally be expected to occur in the
usual course of events. In my view, Purity Biscuit and Schmidt emerge as aberrations in our post-war case law.
The majority opinion holds that henceforth an injury by accident "is an unexpected or unintended occurrence that may
be either the cause or the result of an
injury." (Emphasis in original.) However,
the legislature, whose prerogative it is to
establish policy, has chosen wording which
precludes such an interpretation. The reasoning of Justice Latimer's dissent in Purison, 606 ?2d 237 (Utah 1980); Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Industrial Comm 'n,
590 P.2d 328 (Utah 1979); Redman Warehousing
Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 22 Utah 2d 398, 454
P.2d 283 (1969); Cariing v. Industrial Comm'n,
16 Utah 2d 260,399 P.2d 202 (1965).

3. Emery Mining Corp. v. Defriez. 694 P.2d 606
(Utah 1984); Giles v. Industrial Comm'n, 692
P.2d 743 (Utah 1984); Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Jacobs,
689 P.2d 1335 (Utah 1984); Billings Computer 4. 617 P.2d 693 (Utah 1980).
Corp. v. Tarango, 674 ?2d 104 (Utah 1983);
Sabo's Eke. Serv. v. Sabo, 642 P.2d 722 (Utah 5. 617 P.2d 975 (Utah 1980).
1982); Kaiser Steel v. Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888
(Utah 1981); Farmers Grain Cooperative v. Ma- 6. 16 Utah 2d 260, 399 P.2d 202 (1965).
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ty Biscuit illustrates the shortcomings of
the majority's interpretation. The word
"accident," when viewed in isolation, may
be used to denote both an unexpected occurrence which produces injury as well as
an unexpected injury. The word "injury,"
on the other hand, denotes a result and not
a cause. Had the legislature only used the
word "injury" in section 35-1-45 (U.C.A.,
1953, § 35-1-45 (Repl. Vol. 4B, 1974 ed.,
Supp.1986)), then that statute would cover
all results regardless of the cause. Had
the legislature only used the word "accident," then I would agree with the majority's holding today that the legislature intended to cover both the cause and the
result. In fact, however, the legislature
has used both words "injury" and "accident." It follows that the word "accident"
must be interpreted as focusing upon the
cause and not the result. In short, the
majority's interpretation writes the word
"injury" out of the statute. Such a decision is unwarranted in my view.
The legislature recently amended section
35-1-45,7 but chose to leave intact the standard which limits the payment of compensation to those injured "by accident arising
out of or in the course of . . . employment." 8 Moreover, the singular "injury by
accident" standard has not been altered or
amended since its inception in 1917.9 The
legislature thus being satisfied with the
Court's interpretation of the term "accident" in the long line of cases beginning
with Carling v. Industrial Commission,10
I decline to embark upon a new effort to
redefine that term.

impose legal and medical causation requirements. See U.C.A., 1953, § 35-1-45.
Curiously, the requirement of "legal causation" has two different meanings, depending upon the physical condition of the
worker at the time he is injured. A worker
having no preexisting medical condition or
handicap need only prove that the accident
was caused by a "usual or ordinary exertion." But for congenitally handicapped
persons and for persons who have suffered
preexisting industrial injuries (which presumably have left the worker with some
physical weakness or deterioration), legal
causation has a different meaning. Such a
worker may receive compensation only if
the "employment contribution" to the internal breakdown is "greater than that of
nonemployment life." According to the
majority, such a worker must now prove
that his internal breakdown was caused by
"an unusual or extraordinary exertion"
in order to establish the requisite legal
causation, even though the majority opinion itself criticizes at length the "usual-unusual distinction as a means of proving
causation." How the majority can reject
that standard for persons having no preexisting condition, yet embrace that standard
for persons with preexisting conditions, is
baffling.

STEWART, Justice: (dissenting).
I dissent The majority defines the statutory term "accident" to mean "unexpected result," regardless of whether it is
produced by a usual or an unusual event.
The majority also defines the term "arising
out of or in the course of employment" to

Furthermore, the difference between the
"unusual or extraordinary exertion" which
a worker with a preexisting condition must
demonstrate and the "usual exertion"
which a person with no preexisting condition must demonstrate is far from clear.
The latter standard is to be judged with
respect to the " 'normal nonemployment
life of this or any other person.'" The
Court emphasizes that the "precipitating
exertion must be compared with the usual
wear and tear and exertions of nonemployment life, not the nonemployment life
of the particular worker." What the term
"usual wear and tear and exertions of nonemployment" means is not defined by the

7. Act of Jan. 27, 1984, ch. 75, § 1, 1984 Utah
Laws 610. 610.

9. Act of March 18, 1917, ch. 100, § 52a, 1917
Utah Laws 306, 322-23.

8. U.C.A., 1953, § 35-1-45 (Repl.Vol. 4B, 1974
10. 16 Utah 2d 260, 399 P.2d 202 (1965).
ed.. Supp.1986).

EXHIBIT B-15

30

Utah

729 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

majority. The few examples set out do
little to explain the concept aimed at, other
than to suggest that the term means something more than simple, life-sustaining activities.
I wholly fail to understand why persons
who have a preexisting condition should be
placed in the disadvantaged position, indeed the near-remediless position, that the
majority opinion imposes upon them. The
purpose of the Second Injury Fund is to
provide compensation for workers who
have preexisting medical conditions and
therefore run a greater risk of injury when
they expose themselves to the hazards of
the work place. But the law should encourage such persons to work rather than
encouraging them to abandon the work
force for some kind of unearned support.
This Court has repeatedly stated that the
Second Injury Fund was designed to encourage employers to hire persons with
preexisting conditions by spreading the
risk throughout the industry to assure such
persons that their injuries will be cared for
without imposing extraordinary liabilities
on the employers who hire them. Intermountain Smelting Corp. v. Capitano,
610 P.2d 334, 337 (Utah 1980); McPhie v.
United States Steel Corp., 551 P.2d 504,
505 (Utah 1976). Society certainly ought to
favor those policies which encourage people to work, rather than policies that deter
employers from offering gainful employment to those who have a higher risk of
work-related injury. There is little personal or social benefit from a policy that tends
to discourage persons from working because of prior injuries or disabilities.
Further, it is fundamentally unfair and
flatly inconsistent with the basic purposes
of the workmen's compensation laws to
impose higher standards for compensation
on those with preexisting medical conditions than on those without Tort law generally does not do so. A defendant in a
negligence action is required to take the
victim as the defendant finds him; whatever unusual vulnerabilities the victim may
have are disregarded. That principle
should not be, and until now has not been,

EXHIBIT
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different in workmen's compensation law,
which is really a substitute for tort law
remedies. In short, handicapped or previously injured persons who are injured by
an industrial accident are simply discriminated against by having to meet the majority's rigorous legal cause requirement.
I am also unable to understand how an
administrative law judge, the Industrial
Commission, or an appellate court is supposed to determine what "typical nonemployment activities" are "in today's society," as they now must do for the purpose
of determining legal causation for workers
with preexisting medical conditions. Does
that mean what a typical sixty-five-year-old
does or a typical twenty-one-year-old does
during his or her nonemployment activities? Is it what a professional football
player does in his leisure time or what a
ballet dancer does? Is it what a sedentary
worker does in his or her off-hours or what
a forest ranger does?
Instead of defining a meaningful standard, the majority provides examples which
supposedly illustrate the unarticulated
principle. The examples "include taking
full garbage cans to the street, lifting and
carrying baggage for travel, changing a
flat tire on an automobile, lifting a small
child to chest height, and climbing the
stairs in buildings." These few examples,
which I find to be arguable in any event
since they reflect only what some people
may do from time to time, do not substitute
for a legal standard. I seriously wonder
whether changing a flat tire on an automobile is a typical activity in today's society,
and I do not know how much luggage the
"typical" individual lifts or how far he or
she carries it The point is that the majority has not set forth a workable standard at
all. In fact I have serious doubt that such
an artificial construct as "typical nonemployment activities" will produce more fair
and rational decisions than our past cases.
The majority simply assumes a "typical"
individual for the purpose of establishing a
rational standard. Unfortunately, disabilities happen to real people, not to "average"
people, and the law has always recognized
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as much. In short, I do not think that the
majority's newly established standard will
produce decisions one whit more consistent
or rational than those produced in the
past 1
The majority also holds that an injured
person must prove that the disability is
"medically the result of an exertion or injury that occurred during a work-related activity/' With a degree of hope that I think
is unwarranted, the majority states that
"[t]he medical causal requirement will prevent an employer from becoming a general
insurer of his employees and discourage
fraudulent claims." I am fearful that that
hope is seriously misplaced.
Certainly Professor Larson, largely the
source of the Court's new standards and
analysis, is highly acclaimed in this field of
law, but there is much to be said for the
case-by-case approach in hammering out
legal doctrine, even if it does on occasion
produce inconsistencies. I readily concede
that present law needs to be rationalized
and that some cases should be overruled
because they are hopelessly inconsistent
with other cases, but I do not believe that
the law needs to be revolutionized in such a
manner as to defeat those humane policies
intended to allow for the injuries of workers who come to the work place in an
impaired condition.
I also join the Chief Justice's dissent

Richard E. HOLLOWAY, Plaintiff,
v.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF the
STATE OF UTAH, Richard E. Holloway Trucking [Employer], and the
State Insurance Fund [Insurance carrier for the Employer], Defendants.
No. 20621.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Nov. 21, 1986.
Virginius Dabney, Salt Lake City, for
plaintiff.
David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., James R.
Black, Mary A. Rudolph, Salt Lake City,
for defendants.
STEWART, Justice:
Plaintiff Richard E. Holloway is a selfemployed truck driver. On July 11, 1984,
after driving for about six hours, he
stopped at a rest stop. He claims that he
slipped while walking across an oil spill on
his way to the restroom and that the slip
caused him to jerk to regain his balance. After returning from the restroom, Holloway
bent over to inspect one of his truck tires.
While crouching, he experienced an immediate sharp pain in his back which made
him fall to the ground, landing on his arms
and jaw. His wife, also a truck driver,
drove for the rest of the trip. Two days
after the incident Holloway consulted a chiropractor in Georgia. He consulted another chiropractor on returning to Salt Lake
City. The slip on the oil spill was not
mentioned in the reports of the chiropractors
who examined Holloway, in the First Report of Injury, or in the claimant's report
of how the injury occurred.
The Commission denied review of the
administrative law judge's order. The
judge ruled that the plaintiffs injury was
not the result of an "accident" as that term

1. In my view, the decisions of this Court are
generally reconcilable with only a few glaring
exceptions and most of them prior to 1980.
That there are more inconsistencies the further

back one goes in our body of law is not particularly unexpected. In any event, I doubt that the
new approach will produce unwavering consistency over the years.
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case No. 86000857

*
*

LESTER WAYNE SMITH,

FINDINGS OF FACT

Applicant,
*

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.
SISCO HILTE and/or
ZURICH AMERICAN INSURANCE and
SECOND INJURY FUND,
Defendants.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

*
*

AND ORDER

*
*
*
* *

HEARING:

Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah, 160
East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on December 4,
1986, at 10:00 o'clock a.m..
Said hearing was
pursuant to Order and Notice of the Commission.

BEFORE:

Janet L. Moffitt, Administrative Law Judge.

APPEARANCES:

Applicant was present and represented by Sherlynn W.
Fenstermaker, Attorney at Law.
Defendants were
Attorney at Law.

represented

by Henry K. Chai, II,

Second Injury Fund was joined at the time of the
proceedings and was not represented at the hearing.

The issues to be addressed in this matter are as follows:
1.

Whether the applicant sustained injuries as a result
of a compensable industrial accident on March 25, 1986.

2.

Causal relationship of the injuries to the alleged
accident.

3.

Temporary total disability compensation from March 25,
1986 to November 24, 1986.

4.

Permanent partial impairment and apportionment of said
impairment with defendant, Second Injury Fund.
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5.

Medical expenses including those for surgery on May 28,
1986.

Subsequent to the evidentiary hearing, the medical issues were
submitted to a special panel appointed by the Administrative Law Judge. The
Medical Panel Report was received and circulated to the parties.
No
objections were submitted to the Medical Panel Report. However, counsel for
the defendant did submit legal memorandum regarding the issue of compensable
accident.
Counsel for the applicant responded on June 5, 1987. After
reviewing the Medical Panel Report and the Memorandums submitted in this
matter, the Administrative Law Judge is prepared to make a Findings of Fact
and enter an Order.

FINDINGS OF FACT:
The applicant in this matter, Lester Wayne Smith, is a 40-year-old
male, who, at the time of his industrial injury, was married and had four
dependent children under the age of eighteen. At the time of his injury, the
applicant was earning $7.63 an hour, working forty hours per week. The
applicant began his employment with the defendants in November of 1985. His
duties consisted of running a grinder and some general maintenance work. It
was the defendants' business to clean steel molds and plate the molds with
enforcing steel.
On March 25, 1986, around 2:00 p.m., the applicant was running his
grinder. His supervisor asked him to move some steel plating, which was used
to reinforce the molds. The steel plates were generally banded together and
varied in width and length from 8 feet to 12 feet by 14 inches. Most of the
plates were anywhere from 1/4 inch thick to 3/8 inch thick. The individual
plates would weigh between 50 to 80 pounds, depending on the size. To move
the plates, they had to be unhanded and moved individually. The applicant had
moved two or three plates in this manner. On the next plate, he bent over,
placing one hand on top of the plate and one hand underneath and began to
raise it. When he had it approximately a foot and a half from the top of the
stack, or at approximately his waist level, the applicant felt a sharp snap in
his low back just above the waistline* He had an immediate radiation of sharp
pains into his right leg. There was some question about the size of the plate
the applicant was moving. He initially estimated it to be 12 feet by 14
inches and to weigh approximately 80 pounds. However, the initial doctor*s
report shortly after the incident, indicates that the plate weighed
approximately 50 pounds. Therefore, the Administrative Law Judge adopts that
weight as the most probable weight. The applicant's pain was so sharp that he
had to set the plate down, and he reported the incident to his supervisor.
His supervisor had the applicant stay in the office for the remainder of the
two hours of the shift doing light work. By the time he left for home, his
pain had increased greatly and he developed a burning sensation in his right
leg.
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Because his condition had not improved the next morning, the
applicant made an appointment with the chiropractor, Dr. Hansen. He received
the proper industrial papers from his employer and submitted them to Dr.
Hansen. X-rays were then taken. He commenced a course of manipulations and
heat treatment and was directed to stay off work. The applicant was treated
by the chiropractor for seven weeks. Because his condition had not improved
at the end of the seven week period, Dr. Hansen referred him to Dr. Alan
Hunstock, a neurosurgeon.
The applicant first saw Dr. Hunstock in May of 1986. Dr. Hunstock
directed him to Utah Valley Hospital for x-rays and a CT scan. After those
tests had been completed, surgery was recommended. The surgery was performed
on May 28, 1986, at Utah Valley Hospital. After his release, the applicant
continued his follow-up care with Dr. Hunstock.
The surgery was very
successful in eliminating the applicant's right leg pain. He has had one or
two small recurrences since the surgery, but they have been minor and have
gone away quickly. He still has some backaches on a fairly regular basis,
particularly in the morning. The only medication that he takes for pain is
aspirin. The applicant was released to return to work on November 24, 1986.
He was released with some restrictions regarding lifting and sitting.
The applicant received a total of $1,750.10, in temporary total
disability compensation which was paid from May 14, 1986 through June 5,
1986. He was paid at the rate of $214.89 per week.
The applicant has had several prior injuries. In 1978, while working
for Tichner Ford, the applicant had an injury to his left knee. He was
treated for that injury by Dr. Mendenhall.
Although the incident was
industrial, his benefits were denied because the applicant failed to report
the incident to his employer. The applicant also sustained injuries to the
little finger on his left hand in 1981, when it was cut on a steel plate. The
tip was initially cut off and was sewn back on. The applicant has good use of
the finger and was paid compensation for that injury.
Although the applicant denies having had prior back injuries or
problems, the records of Dr. Mendenhall indicate that he did treat the
applicant for some low back pain in March of 1980, and again in November of
1980. The treatment was primarily conservative but did include the use of a
TENS unit and also some hospitalization.
The records indicate that the
incident occurred when the applicant bent over the fender of an automobile.
The applicant has also had an injury to his head in February of 1984,
while working in Park City. A nail gun, weighing approximately five pounds,
fell and knocked him unconscious. At that time, he received treatment from
Dr. Meyer. An MMPI test was given to the applicant following that injury.
Dr. Meyer apparently diagnosed him as having a conversion disorder.
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The medical panel assigned in this matter found that the applicant
had an overall impairment of 12% of the whole person. Of that amount, 2% was
assigned to his injury to his knee in February of 1978. The remaining 10% was
attributed to the applicant's low back problems with 3/10 being attributed to
the injuries in March of 1980t and 7/10 being attributed to the industrial
accident in March of 1986. It was the panel*s opinion that there was a
medically demonstrable causal connection between the applicant's low back
problems and the industrial accident of March 25, 1986, and that the industrial
injury did medically aggravate a pre-existing impaired condition of the
applicant.
It was also the panel's opinion that the surgery which was
performed on May 28, 1986, was necessary for the applicant to recover from the
aggravation of the pre-existing condition. The panel found that the applicant
was temporarily and totally disabled from March 25, 1986 until the date of
November 24, 1986, when he was released by his treating physician. No
objections having been received, the Administrative Law Judge will adopt the
findings of the medical panel as her own.
The defendants have submitted a Memorandum indicating that the
applicant has not met the burden of legal causation as announced in the Allen
vs. Industrial Commission decision. Counsel for the defendants has argued
that the panel pointed out that the applicant's back problem could have been
triggered by lifting much less than a fifty pound weight and that the fifty
pound weight is similar to some of the everyday activities as discussed by the
Court in the Allen decision. However, the Administrative Law Judge is not
inclined to construe the Allen decision in the same light as the defendants.
It should be pointed out the facts in this matter are not substantially
different from those in the Giles case where the applicant had a substantial
pre-existing condition, but his actual injury was triggered by unusual
exertion. In that case, it was clear that the applicant's eye problem could
have been triggered by something considerably less than the exertion made.
However, the Court upheld the findings of a compensable accident in that
case. The Administrative Law Judge feels that this is a similar situation.
The lifting of an awkward steel plate which weighs approximately fifty pounds
from a level which is approximately between the applicant's waist and knees
seems to the Administrative Law Judge a somewhat unusual exertion, particularly
when it is viewed in light of the fact that the applicant had lifted several
other steel plates in a similar manner just immediately preceding the
occurrence.
An adoption of the medical panel findings would indicate that the
applicant is entitled to temporary total disability compensation at the rate
of $229.00 per week for 34.857 weeks or a total of $7,982.25. Of this amount,
the defendants have already paid a total of $1,750.10, leaving a remainder due
and owing to the applicant of $6,232.15. Additionally, the defendants would
be liable for a 7% permanent partial impairment of the whole person or 21.84
weeks at the rate of $215.00 per week for a total of $4,695.60. The
defendant, Second Injury Fund, would be liable for a 3% permanent partial
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impairment or 9.36 weeks at the rate of $215*00 per week for a total of
$2,012,40, An attorney9s fee will be awarded in this matter based on the
temporary total disability compensation and permanent partial impairment
compensation minus the amounts of temporary total disability compensation
already paid to the applicant. This would result in an attorney*s fee of
$2,588.03. The defendant insurance carrier in this matter shall be entitled
to reimbursement from the defendant, Second Injury Fund, for 30% of all
temporary total disability compensation and medical expenses paid in this
matter.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
The applicant in this matter, Lester Wayne Smith, sustained injuries
as a result of a compensable industrial accident on March 25, 1986, and is
entitled to benefits in accordance with the foregoing Findings of Fact.

ORDER:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the defendants, SISCO Hilte and/or
Zurich American Insurance, pay the applicant, Lester Wayne Smith, compensation
at the rate of $229.00 per week for 34.857 weeks or a total of $7,982.25. Of
this amount, the defendants have paid a total of $1,750.10, leaving a
remainder due and owing to the applicant of $6,232.15, to be paid in a lump
sum minus the attorney's fees to be awarded hereinafter.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants, SISCO Hilte and/or Zurich
American Insurance, pay the applicant compensation at the rate of $215.00 per
week for 21.84 weeks or a total of $4,695.60, as compensation for a 7%
permanent partial impairment resulting from injuries sustained in his
industrial accident on March 25, 1986. Said amount is accrued and to be paid
in a lump sum.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants pay all medical expenses
incurred as the result of the industrial injury, said expenses to be paid in
accordance with the Medical and Surgical Fee Schedule of this Commission.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants pay Sherlynn W.
Fenstermaker, attorney for the applicant, the sum of $2,588.03, as attorney's
fees, said amount to be deducted from the accrued aforesaid award of the
applicant.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Administrator of the Second Injury
Fund prepare fc&e necessary vouchers directing the State Treasurer, as
Custodian of tSut Second Injury Fund, to pay the applicant, Lester Wayne Smith,
compensation at the rate of $2,012.40, as compensation for a 3% permanent
partial
impairaaant resulting from pre-existing
conditions which were
aggravated by f8*e industrial accident on March 25, 1986. Said amount is
accrued and to te paid in a lump sum.
IT IS HIRTHER ORDERED that the defendants, Zurich American Insurance,
shall be entitled to reimbursement for 30% of all temporary total disability
compensation » § medical expenses upon the submission of a verified petition
to the Administrator of the Second Injury Fund indicating the amounts so
expended.
IT IS fSURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the foregoing
shall be file* in writing within fifteen (15) days of the date hereof,
specifying in (ftetail the particular errors and objections, and, unless so
filed, this Qvtimr shall be final and not subject to review or appeal.

Janet L: Hoffitt
Administrative Lail

Passed by the Industrial Commission
of Utah, Salt LsOke City, Utah, this
30^
day af JfeeHy, 1987.
ATTEST:
/s/ Linda J. Strasburq

I

Linda J. Strasbourg
Commission Secretary
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Case No:
LESTER WAYNE SMITH,

86000857

*
*

Applicant,

*
*

vs.
SISCO HILTE and/or
ZURICH AMERICAN INSURANCE and
SECOND INJURY FUND,

*

ORDER DENYING

*
*
*

MOTION FOR REVIEW

*

Defendants.

*
*

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

On July 30, 1987, an Administrative Law Judge of the Industrial
Commission issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order awarding the
applicant in the above-captioned case temporary total compensation, permanent
partial impairment benefits and medical expenses related to a March 25, 1986
back injury. Prior to the issuance of the Order, counsel for the defendant
filed a Memorandum on the issue of legal causation. In that Memorandum,
counsel for the defendant argues that the March 25, 1986 back injury is not
compensable, because the applicant cannot establish legal causation, one of
the elements of compensability per the Supreme Court case Allen v. the
Industrial Commission. 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986). As the applicant had a
previous back condition prior to the March 1986 lifting incident, counsel for
the defendant maintains the applicant must be able to show that the injury
occurred pursuant to unusual exertion in order to establish legal causation.
Counsel for the defendant finds that the lifting of a 50 pound steel plate is
not unusual exertion as it is similar to a list of activities the Court in
Allen found require only normal or usual exertion. Counsel for the applicant
responded to the defendant's pre-hearing Memorandum stating that the weight
and manner of lifting involved in the March 25, 1986 incident clearly takes
the activity out of the usual exertion category.
On October 2, 1987, pursuant to U.C.A. 35-1-82.53, counsel for the
defendant filed a Motion for Review of the Administrative Law Judge's July 30,
1987 Order.
Renewing the arguments earlier made in his pre-hearing
Memorandum, counsel for the defendant argues that the Administrative Law Judge
should not have awarded benefits, as the applicant failed to establish the
legal causation element necessary for a finding of compensability. In the
Memorandum supporting the Motion for Review, counsel for the defendant notes
that the Industrial Commission has adopted a 20 pound standard for determining
what lifting injuries will be considered unusually exertive. Counsel for the
defendant maintains that use of this standard by the Administrative Law Judge
is error as the Allen case list of activities requiring only normal exertion
includes lifting activities that could involve items like the 50 pound plate
lifted by the applicant. Specifically, counsel for the defendant notes that
garbage cans and tires often weigh more than 20 pounds. Counsel for the
applicant responds to this argument in a October 19, 1987 Response to the
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Motion for Review. She states that the manner in which the applicant lifted
the 50 pound plate has to be considered in determining the level of exertion
involved in the March 25, 1986 incident. She notes that the applicant wasn't
lifting with two hands as would be done in the Allen list of lifting
activities, but rather with one hand only.
The sole issue to be determined by the Commission on review is
Whether or not the applicant was injured pursuant to unusual exertion on March
25, 1986, thereby establishing the legal causation element of compensability.
The Commission adopts the Findings of Fact of the Administrative Law Judge
with respect to the manner and weight involved in the March 25, 1986 lifting
incident. Based on the Administrative Law Judge*s findings, the Commission
finds the lifting incident at issue involved unusual exertion. The Commission
does not believe a typical non-employment activity of men and women in the
latter part of the twentieth century includes lifting 50 pounds. It is
conceivable that a tire or garbage can may weigh 50 pounds, but the Commission
believes they typically weigh less than that. The Commission has adopted no
absolute 20 pound standard to use in determining which lifting incidents will
be considered unusually exertive. The 20 pound "standard" comes from a foot
note in the Allen case where the Court quotes with approval Professor Larson
who states the "usual wear and tear of life - which certainly includes lifting
objects weighing 20 pounds."
The Commission finds each case must be
determined based on its own facts and the Commission has been consistent in
finding weight alone should not be the only consideration. In the instant
case, the necessity of lifting comparatively heavy and awkward steel plates
was a risk to the applicant caused by his employment that goes beyond what
typically is required in non-employment life in general. Therefore, per
Allen« liability for the injury caused by that risk is properly placed on the
employer.
Therefore, the Commission must affirm the Administrative Law
Judge's finding that the March 25, 1986 accident meets the legal causation
test and as result is compensable.
ORDER:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the defendant's October 2, 1987 Motion
for Review is denied and the Administrative Law Judge's July 30, 1987 Order is
hereby affirmed and final with further appeal to the Court of Appeals only
within the thirty (30) day time limit and as specified in U.C.A. 35-1-83.

'•L^w^A'-t

Stephen M. Hadley
Chairman

Passed by the Industrial Commission
of Utah, Salt Lake^City, Utah, this

7®*;. day of Mtfpkfc^

«:

U .^dd^L

Lenice L
Commissi

1987.

ATTESJ^

iCmda J. sVt^sburg
//

Commission Secretary
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INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
NORMAN H. BANGERTER, GOVERNOR
March 3 0 , 1987

STEPHEN M HADLEY. CHAIRMAN
WALTER T AXELGARD. COMMISSIONER
L L NIELSEN. COMMISSIONER

CERTIFIED MAIL
RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED

Lester Wayne Smith
115 North 1200 West
Orem, UT 84057
Re:
Inj:
Emp:

Lester Wayne Smith
3-25-86
Sisco Hilte

Dear Mr. Smith:
We are enclosing a copy of the signed Report of the Medical Panel in
connection with your claim.
You are allowed fifteen days from the date of this letter within
which to file objections if you are not satisfied with the findings of the
Panel. Please specify in detail the basis of your objections to each Finding
and Conclusion. Further, state in detail the medical evidence or facts you
rely on as a basis of your objection. Copies of objections must be mailed to
all parties concerned.
Parties who desire to submit the matter on written objections without
a hearing may so indicate in a letter accompanying the objections. A hearing
will not be set on the objections unless there is a proffer of conflicting
medical testimony. If a hearing is scheduled, the Medical Panel Chairman will
be requested by the Commission to appear and testify and all parties will be
notified of the time and place of the hearing.
When no objections to a Medical Panel Report are received, the
Administrative Law Judge will decide the case on the record as currently
constituted.
BY DIRECTION:
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH

JL

net t. Moffitt
Administrative Law Ju

yuc^

JLM:wb
Enclosure
cc: Sherlyn W. Fenstermaker, Atty.,
Sox 559, S p r i n g v i l l e , UT 84663
Henry K. Chai, II, Atty., P. 0. Box 45000, SLC, UT 84145
Erie V. Boorntan, Administrator, Second Injury Fund
Crawford & Company, 715 East 3900 South, #205, Hurray, UT 84107
DEFAULT INDEMNITY FUND > SUZAN PIXTON. ADMINISTRATOR > (801)530-6989
l«> EAST 300 SOUTH • P.O. BOX 45580 • SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84145-0580
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(801) 321-3125
MADISON H. THOMAS, M.D.
• T H A V E N U E & C STREET
SALT LAKE C I T Y , U T A H 84143

March 2, 1987
Janet L. Moffitt
Administrative Law Judge
Industrial Commission of Utah
160 East 300 South
P.O. Box 45580
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0580
Re: Lester Wayne Smith
Inj: 03-25-86 '
Emp: Sisco Hilte
REPORT OF MEDICAL PANEL
A medical panel, consisting of Drs. Boyd Holbrook and Madison H. Thomas,
with the latter as chairman, met to review the case of Lester Wayne Smith,
with reference to an industrial injury reported to have occurred on March
25th, 1986. The patient's history was reviewed with him by members of the
panel. The summary of the testimony was reviewed with him, with general
agreement as to the outline of it. However, he did not recall Dr. Hunstock
giving him any restrictions in releasing him for work. On the third page,
he indicated it was the right knee that was injured.
The medical file was reviewed with him, with particular reference to his
1980 treatment. X-rays were reviewed and the patient was examined by the
members of the panel.
The applicant indicates that on March 25th, 1986, he was generally feeling
well and having no difficulty with his health. Shortly after lunch, he was
moving the plates of steel, approximately fifty feet and restacking them. He
describes these plates as being about eight feet long and eight to ten inches
wide, and one-fourth to three-eighths inch thick, weighing about 60 to 80
poiunds. Usually, one man takes each end of the plate, but he was alone,
and because of the urgency to get the area cleared, he was moving them himself. He had moved four or five of these after lunch.
He reports that he bent over to pick up one of these plates, which he recalls was
about a foot-and-a-half above ground level, on a pile. He got his hands underneath the plate, and believes his knees were slightly bent. His back was almost to a horizontal level, as he lifted on the plate. As he did so, he felt
as if he had been hit in the lower back, and experienced severe pain there,
as well as pain and a burning sensation down the back of his right leg, to the
calf and to his whole foot. He dropped the plate back in place and reported
to his boss, and an accident report was completed. He believes he spent
most of the rest of the afternoon until a four o'clock quitting time, in
the office.
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He reports he drove home. The pain in his right leg ras worse than in the
back. He took aspirin and lay on the bed, but found this was woise, so he
spent some time standing up during the evening. He retired about nine or
ten p.m., and slept poorly. In the morning, he could scarcely walk because
of the pain, principally in the right leg. He called his boss, and then
went for a chiropractic treatment. He was told bf ihe cfiir«pracyt<jrjttifty he
had a disc that was pinching his sciatic nerve, aadJ h#e> had fhi/cjnaf ticj treatments every other day for about seven weeks. At firsts 't?his*feeerfed'to help
for an hour to an hour-and-a-half, but then it seemed not to help at all,
and he was sent to Dr. Hunstock.
The studies done by Dr. Hunstock comfirmed the presence of a herniated disc,
and he reports that on May 28th, 1986, he had surgery. He had had severe
pain, persisting up to the time of surgery, and describes walking at a
45° tilt because of the pain and spasms. Immediately after surgery, he
felt the severe pain was relieved, and he went home after five days. Since
then, he has had good days and bad days, about half and half, but generally,
he feels he has had a great deal of relief from the surgery.
The patient indicates he continues to have some light pain, which has been
increased in the past few weeks by increased activities, such as bowling.
When he does something like this, he will take a couple of Tylenol and lie
down for an hour or so and get to feeling better. Sitting on a bleacher
seat without a backrest, likewise aggravated the pain. Occasionally, he
has feelings of numbness in the right leg and foot, at times accompanied by
tingling as far down as the bottom of the foot, which is increased with
activities. He feels the back is still stiff, and that the severity of his
pain is about as much in the back, as well as the leg. Coughing or sneezing heavily will cause a sharp pain. Riding or sitting for very long will
bother him. He prefers to walk or stand alternately with sitting. He has
been active around the house and helps clean up the house, and tinker with
things. He has been doing some taxidermy work at home. He has not returned
to work, though he understands he was released on November 24th, without
limitations, although he was given instructions in the use and care of his
back. He has been seeking work, but there's not much available in his area.
He f s had no involvement with rehabilitation activities, though someone in
Job Service talked to him briefly, but nothing has been done since.
The patient indicates that in 1980, he pulled a muscle in his back, with a
large knot, and he points to the right paraspinal lumbar region. He does not
recall losing time from work at that time, and his regular medical insurance
took care of the medical expenses at the time, although it was reported as
an industrial event.
I subsequently reviewed with him the details in the medical record, indicating that he had reported that on March 4th, 1980, he had been bending over
a fender and lifting something in his work as a mechanic, when he "felt
something snap in the back11. He had spasms and pain at the time, and recalls taking time off work for physical therapy. He does not recall being
in a hospital in April, but when we reviewed the records, he acknowledged
he must have been in the hospital, but mixed it with some other injury. He
feels he gradually improved, and felt fully recovered from that event, after
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several months.
He reports his general health has been good. He recalled no major medical
illnesses. He recalls injuring a cartilage in his knee about ten years ago,
and subsequently having surgery on the right knee. He slipped off a bumper
and fell. This did not seem to bother him for about a- veek. until the knee
locked, and he vent down. He had good response from the surgery, and feels
he has no trouble with it, currently.
In 1979, he lacerated his left fifth finger, near the knuckle, and recalls
being hospitalized for three days for repair of it, with good response. He
feels it occasionally will catch and will sometimes hurt, but it does not
limit him in his work. He recalled the injury with the nail-gun when he
was unconscious for a short time. He thinks he was knocked down, and it was
about three hours before he knew what was going on. He believes his first
recollection was after reaching Parkview Medical Center. He does not think
he had any lost time from that, but had severe headaches, ultimately seeing
someone for a psychiatric evaluation, and understanding they thought he had
a "split personality". His headaches have improved, so that he only has them
quite infrequently now. He has had no fainting spells or other indications
of residual from the head injury.
He previously used alcohol, but has had none in the past 15 years. It was
never a problem for him. He has smoked about a pack of cigarettes a day for
the past 25 years. He reports leaving school in the tenth grade. He has had
some mechanical courses, but no further education.
A review of the records shows the following highlights: There is
of an industrial accident reported on February 25th, 1978, which
in the right knee and led to removal of the meniscus and shaving
patella in the right knee, because of finding of a torn meniscus
malacia of the patella.
On September 12th, 1979, he lacerated his left hand
the fifth finger was found and repaired.

a notation
caused pain
of the
and chondro-

and extensor tendon of

The records show the incident of sudden pain in his lower back when he was
lifting something while bent over a fender, occurring on March 4th, 1980.
He was noted to have severe pain and muscle spasms in the lumbar region.
Straight leg raising was limited to 40° on the right. He had physical
therapy on 30 occasions between March 19th and may 6th, as an outpatient,
and was also treated as an inpatient from April 10th to 12th, 1980. He was
given a TENS unit, and this was returned in four months, with a note "No
symptoms", apparently indicating he had improved. On May 1st, 1980, an EMG
showed a mild compromise of S-l roots, more on the right than the left, and
mild irritation of the L-5 roots, more on the right than the left. On May
11th, 1984, it was indicated he was knocked out for a few minutes, and suffered a laceration, and was told to stay in bed for about five days. An EEG
was within normal limits, as was a CT scan, skull X-ray, etc.
On July 1, 1984, he had symptoms of vertigo, but these have apparently not
recurred. In October, 1984, an X-ray of his ankle was taken, but he does
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not recall what that was for.
On March 25th, following the March 4th injury, he wa$ Rioted as «>eipfe '.tender
over L5-S1, and having straight leg raising limited td 25c on the right, with
90° allowed on the left. On May 12th, 1986, X-ray and CT scan showed abnormalities at 4-5 and 5-1. On May 28th, 1986, an L5r-Sl di«jec*«my#vasj#d<j$e.
Dr. Hunstockfs notes confirm his steady trend of inereasjLiqg ;actiyi£d;e£ £t
his encouragement subsequently. He has apparently ijot;b££Ti^ditatfon-flependent, and currently uses aspirin only intermittently.
Examination revealed a patient of about the stated age of 40, who was tall
and nonobese. He appeared generally well. Blood pressure 130/80. He was
alert and responsive and showed no impairment of memory, thinking, or ability
to communicate. He appeared to give responses as best his memory would
serve him.
Cranial nerve survey showed no abnormality.
Sensory examination showed him to have a subjective decrease in perception of
sharp object and the tuning fork, on the right foot and ankle, as compared
with the left. Sensation above the foot was satisfactory.
Motor examination showed him able to stand and walk, without difficulty. He
could stand on single leg or walk tandem with eyes open or closed. He could
hop on either leg and could walk on heels or toes. There was no asymmetry
of strength, and calf and thigh measurements were equal. No abnormal involuntary movements or abnormality of tone were noted.
Reflexes were symmetrical and within normal limits, 2+ throughout, except for
the right ankle jerk, which was a weak 1-1- response, and somewhat variable.
The head and neck were not remarkable. No limitation of neck function, and
the upper extremity range of motion and movements were all normal. The back
showed a two-inch scar in the lumbosacral area, with tenderness over the
scar. There was no tenderness in the lumbar paraspinal area. Buttocks tone
was good. There was no sciatic tenderness. He could bend forward to reach
within 10 inches of the floor, and there was very slight restriction of extension, lateral bending and rotation. There was no associated muscle
spasm.
The right knee showed a three-inch scar in the medial oblique position. This
was well-healed. The patella appeared smooth. There was no joint crepitation
or fluid, and the joint appeared stable. On forced flexion of the right knee,
he reported pain spreading to the top of the right buttocks, but this did not
occur on the left. With right hip flexion, there was slight limitation, and
at the limits, he reported his toes tingled on forced flexion. This was normal
on the left. Straight leg raising was free to 85° on the left, with a negative response ^ c ^fe^%% c h i n g* There was a limitation at 70° on the right,
with moderate/on stretching. The feet had normal temperature, color, and
pulse.
There was a curved one-and-a-quarter inch scar in the vicinity of the left
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fifth knuckle. There was neglible limitation of fulx flexion r.nd medial
stretching compared with the opposite hand, but the <*egre2 or range was
within the published normals. A mild degree of hammer-toe pattern, affecting the fifth toes bilaterally was found.
COMMENT:
It is apparent from combining the history and the medical records, that this
person has had two significant events affecting his lower back. The first
required extended periods of treatment, including use of a TENS unit. There
was evidence of root compression on EMG, although he did not have the benefit of X-ray or CT study, at the time. He perhaps confused his three days
in the hospital for the back with the time he spent for repair of his
left hand injury, and he no longer disagrees with the facts as recorded in
the medical records. The second event occurred on March 25th, 1986, and
led quite reasonably to surgical management, with relatively good results,
since then.
Assuming, but not deciding that the applicant was involved as outlined,
the panel concludes in terms of reasonable medical probability as follows.
1. There is a medically demonstrable causal connection between the
applicant's low back problems and the industrial accident of March
25h, 1986.
2. All of the residual problems complained of by the applicant, were
not caused by a pre-existing condition.
3. The industrial injury medically aggravated a pre-existing impaired condition of the applicant, as suggested in the attached tabulation.
4. Assuming that an aggravation of a pre-existing condition occurred,
the applicant may or may not have recovered, had he not had surgery on
May 28th, 1896, but the panel feels that in view of the described
pattern at the time, this would probably not have occurred within a
reasonable period of time, and hence the surgery was entirely appropriate.
COMMENT:
It is well known that some individuals with discogenic pain will over a
long period of time, stabilize and become relatively symptom-free, but the
degree of pain, the findings on clinical and radiologic studies, etc.,
suggest that in some cases, this is not likely to happen within a reasonable
interval. What a reasonable interval is depends on the severity of the pain,
the nature of patient's response to it, the nature of the clinical and laboratory findings, etc.
5. The period or periods of time during which the applicant has been
temporarily, totally disabled, as a result of the industrial injury,
after March 25th, 1986, is from then until November 24th, 1986, the
date on which his operating surgeon released him for work.
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COMMENT:
This is approximately a six-month interval, which is generally accepted as
a conservative time, following this type of surgery, and apparently parallels
the patient's feeling that he has reached a relatively stable level, although
he has had fluctuations from day to day.
6. The percentage of permanent physical imp&irment ihraip all
conditions is shown in the attached table.

Causes and

7. The percentage of permanent physical impairment attributable to
the industrial injuries of March 4th, 1980 and March 25th, 1986, is
as shown in the attached table.
8. A percentage of permanent physical impairment attributabe to
previous existing conditions is shown in the attached table.
COMMENT:
The above formulations are based on the history and medical records, indicating
that following the 1980 lifting injury, he did have approximately a four
month period of discogenic pain, although this was not proven by surgery. All
of the clinical findings and patterns are consistent with this, including the
fact
the problem became quiescent after a period of months of treatment, which included a short term of hospitalization. From then until March
25th, 1986, he would be considered to have discogenic disease in a state of
remission. In this circumstance, he is more vulnerable to additional difficulty, than had he not had that previous incident and the panel has attempted
to postulate a reasonable balance of contributory factors between these two
incidents.
Members of the panel will be happy to try and make further clarification on
these matters if it would be helpful.
Respectfully submitted,

MAT>ipiON H. THOMAS, M.D.

BOYD HOLBROOK, M.D.

MHT/TL429
d: 3-2-87
t : 3-6-87
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Attachment:

Chart

Re: Lester Wayne Smith
2 March 1987

% Whole Man Impairment

%

'

Status post-discectomy
L5-S1, without
fusion.

Whole
Man
Impairment

4 Mar
1980

25 Mar
1986

10

3/10

7/10

-

25 Feb
1978

R knee status postmeniscectomy
( 5% LE)

2% z

-

-

All*

Status post-repair of
lacerated extensor
tendon, left 5th
finger x

0

-

-

-

!

•Previously denied
because of late
reporting
xComprensation
previously paid.
zNo change in status of the knee is apparent since Dr. Mendenhall's
evaluation, which was done according to guidelines in use at that
time. The panel sees no need to change the percentage simply to
comply with revised guidelines.
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NEUROLOGY

MADISON H. THOMAS, M.D.
• T H A V E N U E & C STREET
SALT LAKE C I T Y , U T A H S4143

March 2, 1987
Janet L. Moffitt
Administrative Law Judge
Industrial Commission of Utah
160 East 300 South
P.O. Box 45580
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0580
Re: Lester Wayne Smith
Inj: 03-25-86
Emp: Sisco Hilte
Although the panel was not asked to respond to some further specific
questions, it is noted that in his letter of February 10th, 1987, Mr.
Henry Chai II, raised additional questions, which we will respond to,
aside from the formal panel report, in the event this will be of any
value to you.
With reference to his second paragraph on page two, it would appear that
part of the discrepancy noted with respect to his right knee, might be
accounted for by the fact that Dr. Mendenhall undoubtedly used AMA Guidelines in use at the time to give 5 percent of lower extremity or 2 percent
of whole man. Newer guidelines indicate 10 percent of lower extremity or
4 percent of whole man. (See chart at end or panel report.)
With reference to his questions in the last paragraph, we have referred to
the pre-existing condition prior to March 25th, 1986, as being disc disease
in a state of remission. It is impossible to predict in a given case,
whether that condition would continue to degenerate , or not, because some
do and some do not. In general, someone in that condition is more susceptible to future aggravation of the problem, but some cases will go on to
a lifetime essentially symptom-free, and others will go on to increasing
symptoms requiring further management. This is somewhat related to the
nature of the demands made on the back after the first incident, but not
entirely so, so that specific prediction is difficult.
It is impossible for the panel to specify a "minimum weight" that would have
triggered the pre-existing condition, because there is no provable point
at which a weight will inevitably cause aggravation. It is well known that
factors of the person1s relative posture or position of the back, with
reference to what is being lifted, as well as the weight, must be taken into
consideration. The way in which the lifting takes place, whether the object
is held out away from the body or close to the body, has a bearing. The
work circumstance, as to whether there is an alternative way of accomplishing
the task, and at the same time minimizing the compression effect on the back.
The degree to which there is a rotational component involved, also has a
bearing of how much weight might have an effect in one person compared with
another. Thus, it is quite reasonable to think that a weight much less than
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50 pounds, could trigger recurring symptoms, depending upo'n the individual,
upon the past status of the back, upon the posture of the back, upon .any. .
turning and lifting mechanics involved, etc. Thus, it appears that »the concept
of minimum weight is more a legal one than a medical one, since it appears
to based more on legal determinations than on medical kjiopledgg.
If the additional comments in this letter are redundant* please feel free
to discard them, but since the questions have been raised, we thought we
would respond while our focus on the case was fresh.
Our differences from Dr. Hunstockfs conclusions in January 9, 1987 letter,
are not substantive, but probably reflect simply a difference of interpretation, based on the probability of our having somewhat more extensive
records available than he had, at the time.
Respectfully submitted,

MADISON

H. THOMAS, M.D.

BOYD H0LBR00K, M.D.

MHT/TL429
d: 3-2-87
t: 3-6-87
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NEUROLOGY

MADISON H. THOMAS, M.D.
8TH AVENUE & C STREET
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 94143

March 2, 1987
Janet L. Moffitt
Administrative Law Judge
Industrial Commission of Utah
160 East 300 South
P.O. Box 45580
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0580
Re: Lester Wayne Smith
Inj: 03-25-86
Emp: Sisco Hilte
Although the panel was not asked to respond to some further specific
questions, it is noted that in his letter of February 10th, 1987, Mr.
Henry Chai II, raised additional questions, which we will respond to,
aside from the formal panel report, in the event this will be of any
value to you.
With reference to his second paragraph on page two, it would appear that
part of the discrepancy noted with respect to his right knee, might be
accounted for by the fact that Dr. Mendenhall undoubtedly used AMA Guidelines in use at the time to give 5 percent of lower extremity or 2 percent
of whole man. Newer guidelines indicate 10 percent of lower extremity or
4 percent of whole man. (See chart at end or panel report.)
With reference to his questions in the last paragraph, we have referred to
the pre-existing condition prior to March 25th, 1986, as being disc disease
in a state of remission. It is impossible to predict in a given case,
whether that condition would continue to degenerate , or not, because some
do and some do not. In general, someone in that condition is more susceptible to future aggravation of the problem, but some cases will go on to
a lifetime essentially symptom-free, and others will go on to increasing
symptoms requiring further management. This is somewhat related to the
nature of the demands made on the back after the first incident, but not
entirely so, so that specific prediction is difficult.
It is impossible for the panel to specify a "minimum weight11 that would have
triggered the pre-existing condition, because there is no provable point
at which a weight will inevitably cause aggravation. It is well known that
factors of the person's relative posture or position of the back, with
reference to what is being lifted, as well as the weight, must be taken into
consideration. The way in which the lifting takes place, whether the object
is held out away from the body or close to the body, has a bearing. The
work circumstance, as to whether there is an alternative way of accomplishing
the task, and at the same time minimizing the compression effect on the back.
The degree to which there is a rotational component involved, also has a
bearing of how much weight might have an effect in one person compared with
another. Thus, it is quite reasonable to think that a weight much less than
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50 pounds, could trigger recurring symptoms, depending upon the individual,
upon the past status of the back, upon the posture of the brcfc, upon any
turning and lifting mechanics involved, etc. Thus, it appears :hat the concept
of minimum weight is more a legal one than a medical one, since it appears
to based more on legal determinations than on medical knowledp,*.
If the additional comments in this letter are redundant, plcace fsel tr^e
to discard them, but since the questions have been raised, we thought we
would respond while our focus on the case was fresh.
Our differences from Dr. Hunstock's conclusions in January 9, 1987 letter,
are not substantive, but probably reflect simply a difference of interpretation, based on the probability of our having somewhat more extensive
records available than he had, at the time.
Respectfully submitted,

MADISON

H. THOMAS, M.D.

BOYD H0LBR00K, M.D.

MHT/TL429
d: 3-2-87
t: 3-6-87
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the 4th day of May, 1988, I caused
four true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of
Plaintiffs/Appellants' Motion for Review of Order of the
Industrial Commission of Utah to be mailed first class, postage
prepaid, to the following parties of record:
Sherlynn White Fenstermaker
42 North University Avenue
Second Floor, Suite 1
Provo, Utah 84601
Telephone: (801) 375-6077
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
P. 0. Box 45580
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0580

